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ABSTRACT
The relationship between property and speech is close, but
complicated. Speakers use places and things to deliver their mes-
sages, and rely on property rights both to protect expressive acts and
to serve as an independent means of expression. And yet courts and
scholars have struggled to make sense of the property-speech
connection. Is property merely a means of expression, or can it be
expressive in and of itself? And what kind of “property” do speakers
need to have—physical things, bundles of rights, or something else
entirely?
In the context of government property and government speech, the
ill-defined relationship between property and speech creates a
massive but underappreciated theoretical and doctrinal problem,
which threatens the very existence of the public forum. The arc of
First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly as manifested in public
forum doctrine, has been toward limiting the government’s right to
exclude unwanted private speakers. Government speech doctrine,
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however, effectively reinvigorates the government’s right to exclude
unwanted speakers by transforming speech regulations into govern-
mental expressive conduct, which under current government speech
doctrine is entirely exempt from constitutional review. The govern-
ment can therefore invoke not only its property rights, but also the
expressive nature of their exercise. 
Something has to give. Either not all property is expressive, or else
not all expressive uses of government property are government
“speech” exempt from constitutional scrutiny. Part I of this Article
explores the first of these propositions, arguing that the relationship
between speech and property requires a more nuanced treatment than
it has heretofore received, and that property—whether conceived of
as a thing, a legal entitlement, or a social relationship—both enables
and is expression. But, as Part II of the Article shows, that conclu-
sion cannot easily be extended into the context of government
property and government speech. In government property/govern-
ment speech cases such as Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the
question should be whether the government has the right to exclude
unwanted speakers, not whether the exercise of such a right—
assuming the government has it—is expressive. And the best way to
answer the correct question is by looking not to formal property
rights, but to social understandings of property.
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INTRODUCTION
Property and property rights are the basic mechanisms of
expression. Without them, the marketplace of ideas as we know it
would not exist. Access to the public forum allows speakers to
communicate, intellectual property rights incentivize and protect
creative expression, and the very exercise of property rights can
itself be an expressive act—excluding protestors with whom one
does not agree, for example. Property and speech are therefore
deeply intertwined. 
This close relationship, however, raises thorny problems when the
property or speech at issue belong to the government.1 Under
current First Amendment doctrine, the growing category of
government speech is totally exempt from scrutiny.2 And if govern-
ment property is “expressive” in the same way as private property,
then the exclusion of unwanted speakers from public property would
seem to be an act of government expression beyond the reach of the
First Amendment. Of course, this runs directly counter to the very
notion of the public forum, in which the government—despite
having formal property rights—has only a limited right to exclude
private speakers. The viability of meaningful public forum doctrine,
therefore, depends on showing that government property and
government speech are not totally intertwined. And this leads to a
host of difficult questions. If the government decides to exercise its
putative right to exclude an unwanted speaker, is it being
expressive—and thus shielded by government speech doctrine—or
is it engaging in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a public
forum?3 What if the government divests itself of formal legal title to
1. See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 572 (1980) (“The
government speech question has usually reached the Supreme Court in controversies
concerning how public property should be used.”).
2. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (“[T]he Government’s own
speech ... is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”); Helen Norton, The Measure of
Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008) (noting
increasing number of government speech cases).
3. This was the major issue that divided the Tenth Circuit in Summum v. Pleasant Grove
City. The panel opinion concluded that the public park was a public forum, Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050 (10th Cir. 2007), and an equally divided vote of the
court refused to rehear that decision en banc, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d
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a piece of property that is linked to unconstitutional government
expression—religious speech, for example4—but a reasonable
observer would still perceive the property as belonging to the
government?5 Does the divestiture of formal property rights serve
to erase government speech, just as their exercise in the former
example arguably creates it? 
Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate and complicate these
questions.6 In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, a religious order
called the Summum sought to erect a monument in a government-
owned park that already featured other religious iconography, in-
cluding a prominent Ten Commandments monument.7 The City of
Pleasant Grove refused to permit the Summum monument, and
litigation ensued—not under the Establishment Clause, but under
the Free Speech Clause.8 Framed thus, the question became
whether the exclusion of the Summum monument was government
speech, and therefore exempt from the First Amendment, or a
restriction of private speech in a public forum, and therefore subject
1170, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007). Judge Lucero dissented from the denial of rehearing, arguing that
the park was not a public forum, id. at 1171 (Lucero, J., dissenting), and Judge McConnell
also dissented, arguing that the monuments were government speech, id. at 1175 (McConnell,
J., dissenting).
4. Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between
Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 145 (2009-10) (“The only clear limit
on government speech is the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”).
5. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (discussing Buono v. Kempthorne, 527
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub. nom. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009)).
6. For a more complete discussion of the role of property in Summum and Buono, see
Joseph Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 83, 94
(2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/31/LRColl2009n31Blocher
.pdf; see also Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 52 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern
.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28Lund.pdf (“[T]he government speech doctrine
applied in Summum is actually a prerequisite to the government’s very ability to endorse
religion—the government needs the power to exclude contrary messages simply in order to
create a religious endorsement at all.”); Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
2009/30/LRColl2009n30Tebbe.pdf (discussing government use of private-law rules to avoid
public-law obligations).
7. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
8. For an explanation as to why Summum was not an Establishment Clause case, see
Bernadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
95 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/32/LRColl2009n32
Meyler.pdf.
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to heightened scrutiny. In finding the former, the Court emphasized
that the city had “taken ownership of most of the monuments in the
Park”9 and that “[t]he monuments that are accepted, therefore, are
meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government
message, and they thus constitute government speech.”10 In other
words, the Court held that by exercising its property rights—both
formally and as they were socially recognized—Pleasant Grove was
also engaging in expression. Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion
put the matter simply: “This case involves a property owner’s rejec-
tion of an offer to place a permanent display on its land.”11
But in Salazar v. Buono, which many scholars see as a companion
to Summum,12 the Court faced a different scenario, because the
formal and social understandings of property pointed in different
directions.13 In that case, a Latin cross had been privately con-
structed and maintained for almost seventy years in the midst of a
vast public park.14 In an effort to remedy this recognized Establish-
ment Clause violation, Congress attempted to convey to a private
party the small piece of property on which the cross stood, with the
apparent understanding that the cross would remain in place.15
However effective this transfer would be as a matter of formal
property law, it surely would do little to change the public percep-
tion of who owned and approved the cross. The cross is set back hun-
dreds of feet from the road in a huge park that is clearly public,16
and a reasonable observer unfamiliar with the Buono litigation
would almost certainly still perceive it to be public property and
therefore, perhaps, government speech.17 But in a fractured set of
9. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1138 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 803 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The [First] Amendment ... does
not destroy all property rights. In particular, it does not empower individuals to erect
structures of any kind on public property.”).
12. See supra note 6 (referring to articles comparing the two cases).
13. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
14. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 769 (“When uncovered, the cross is visible from vehicles traveling on Cima Road,
which passes through the Preserve, from a distance of approximately 100 yards away. No sign
indicates that the cross was or is intended to act as a memorial for war veterans.”).
17. Id. at 772 (“We [have] also held that a reasonable observer, even without knowing
whether Sunrise Rock is federally owned, would believe—or at least suspect—that the cross
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opinions, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court
for further consideration of “the context in which the [land transfer]
statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage.”18 That the
Court left open the possibility of a continuing Establishment Clause
violation, despite the government’s divestiture of formal title,
indicates its willingness to consider the relationship between
government speech and government property as involving more
than simply formal property rights.
This Article explores the deep structure of the relationship
between government property and government speech—a relation-
ship that underlies Summum and Buono and upon which the very
idea of the public forum depends. It argues that the approach taken
in cases like Summum—one which focuses on the expressiveness of
formal property rights—supplies the correct answer to the wrong
question. The Article begins by explaining in detail why the
Summum Court was right to conclude that property and the
exercise of property rights can be expressive. Part I of the Article
explores this principle by disaggregating the idea of property into
three major conceptions—a thing or place, a legal entitlement, and
a social norm or understanding—and addressing each in turn. In
doing so, Part I argues that property rights not only enable
expressive acts, but also can serve as an independent means of
expression. The government’s rejection of the Summum monument,
for example, both protected whatever preexisting message the
government was communicating through its maintenance of the
park (for example, “Pleasant Grove is wonderful”) and also served
as its own separate communicative act of rejection (for example,
“Pleasant Grove disagrees with the Summum”). Thus, it is too
simplistic to treat speech as if it were dependent on property; the
two are interdependent and intertwined. 
The Summum Court was therefore right, albeit for reasons it did
not state, that property and property rights are expressive. In
another respect, however, the Court erred—not by giving the wrong
answer, but by asking the wrong question. The inquiry should have
been whether the City of Pleasant Grove had a right to exclude the
rests on public land because of the vast size of the Preserve, more than 90 percent of which
is federally owned.”).
18. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1816.
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Summum monument, not whether the use of such a right was
expressive. After all, the basic rule of the First Amendment is that
the government does not have a right to exclude speakers on the
basis of their viewpoint.19 Answering the correct question requires
not only making sense of the notion that property both enables and
is expression, but also reconciling the doctrines of government
speech and the public forum. This is the major project of Part II.
Part II.A begins by showing how the growth of the public forum
changed the meaning of government “property” from a simple
matter of formal ownership to something based more on “tradition”
and social norms, thereby limiting the government’s right to
exclude. Government speech doctrine, however, has effectively
restored that right, albeit in the guise of expression rather than
property. Parts II.B and II.C therefore try to draw lines between
expressive and nonexpressive government property, and to explain
how the principles described in this Article can illuminate past
government property disputes and help resolve others. 
In many ways, government property has become government
speech because the Court has characterized the government’s right
to exclude as a form of expression rather than as a property right.
And because the government’s expression is entirely exempt from
First Amendment scrutiny, it seems to follow that there is no
constitutional bar to such expressive exclusions from government
property. This Article describes and evaluates this development and
suggests ways to prevent it from destroying the public forum. 
I. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY AND EXPRESSION 
The relationship between property and expression is even more
important, and more complicated, than it first appears. Certainly,
various forms of property—public parks, newspapers, loudspeakers,
and currency, for example—enable and facilitate expression. But
these places and things are not what lawyers mean by “property.”
In law, the concept denotes something more ephemeral: the formal
bundle of rights, or even the social norms and understandings,
19. See Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 569-70.
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governing ownership of a particular thing.20 Moreover, property—no
matter how it is defined—is more than just an instrumental aid to
expression; it can itself be expressive. When a property owner ex-
cludes an unwanted monument from her land, for example, the very
act is expressive. Does it follow, then, that formal ownership is an
ongoing act of expression that should be accorded First Amendment
protection? Does expressive ownership mean something more than
holding a title? If a property owner’s exclusion of an unwanted
monument from her front lawn is “expressive,” can she also raise a
First Amendment challenge, and not simply a takings claim, when
the telephone company wants an easement? Surely not every
exclusion is expression, just as not every sound is speech. But where
should the lines be drawn?
Courts and scholars have not answered these questions, and few
have even asked them.21 Those few who have tried have made
limited—albeit sometimes successful—inroads describing the
property-speech connection within particular contexts. For example,
it has been convincingly demonstrated that property rights can in-
centivize expression by permitting exclusion, the central concern of
intellectual property doctrines like copyright,22 and that free speech
needs “breathing space” that can only be provided by property and
place, the central concern of First Amendment doctrines like forum
analysis and the time, place, and manner test.23 
But these observations, although undoubtedly true, are only part
of a much more nuanced story. Because property and expression are
complex concepts, it is surprisingly difficult even to describe their
relationship, much less make sense of it. This Article therefore
20. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 1-2 (1997).
21. Cf. Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 586 (2006)
[hereinafter Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics] (noting that such questions “have not received
concentrated attention from First Amendment scholars”).
22. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the
Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897 (2009). For a sustained
analysis, see DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 149-91 (2009).
23. See generally MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
PUBLIC SPACE (2004); TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2009); Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing Public Forums To
Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 201, 207-13 (2007).
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begins by disaggregating the notion of “property” into three major
conceptions: a place or thing, a legal entitlement, and a social norm
or understanding. In doing so, it argues that property—however
conceived—not only enables, limits, and incentivizes expression, but
also has its own independent expressive value. Part I thus attempts
to address the relationship between expression and property in all
its forms and to show that property is more than just an instrument
of expression. It is in many cases not just a means, but an end.
Before beginning the analysis, a brief discussion of terms is in order. 
A. Disaggregating “Property,” Defining “Expression”
1. Three Conceptions of Property
Although the definition of “property” has always been contested
and undoubtedly will continue to evolve,24 the leading definitions
tend to treat it as one of three things: a place or thing, legal en-
titlement, or a social norm or understanding.25 
The first and simplest definition of property conceives of it as a
place or thing—a piece of land, for example, or a monument.26 This
is the popular, nonlegal understanding of property, and it is a useful
starting point for thinking about property’s speech-enabling func-
tions. Most people have little difficulty concluding that Speaker’s
Corner (a prototypical piece of property-as-place) must be open to
political speeches (a prototypical act of First Amendment-protected
expression) in order for the public forum to have any meaning. The
same can be said, of course, for possession of nonphysical “things”
like broadcast frequencies,27 or access to nonphysical “places” like
24. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV.
711, 713 n.8 (1996) (tracing development of the “bundle of rights” metaphor).
25. For a useful exposition of the first two views, see Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries
of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1188-94 (1999). For the canonical statement of the
third view, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991). 
26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335-36 (9th ed. 2009) (giving second definition of “property”
as “[a]ny external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are
exercised”).
27. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636-38 (1993).
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publicly funded legal services,28 charitable campaigns,29 or an
intraschool mail system.30
In the law’s eyes, however, property refers not to places and
things but to the set of legal entitlements governing them.31 As 
Ronald Coase himself explained: “[W]hat are traded in the market
are not, as is often supposed by economists, physical entities, but
the rights to perform certain actions and the rights which individu-
als possess [as] established by the legal system.”32 This “bundle of
rights” view—which has roots even deeper than Coase—has come
to dominate legal doctrine and scholarship.33 The second conception
of property that must be addressed, then, is the view of property as
a set of legal entitlements. By far the most important of these legal
entitlements is the right to exclude—often considered the sine qua
non of property. As Thomas Merrill puts it: “[P]roperty means the
right to exclude others from valued resources, no more and no
less.”34 The exercise of that right, in turn, is at the heart of much ex-
pressive activity, including expressive association.35 Thus, although
scholars who have addressed the connection between property and
speech rightly bemoan the fact that “[c]ourts and commentators
cannot seem to get past the idea that place is merely a form of
28. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001).
29. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985).
30. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
31. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1335 (9th ed. 2009) (giving first
definition of “property” as “[t]he right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing (either
a tract of land or a chattel); the right of ownership .... Also termed bundle of rights.”)
(emphasis added); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 731-32 (1998) (“[N]early everyone agrees that the institution of property is not concerned
with scarce resources themselves (‘things’), but rather with the rights of persons with respect
to such resources.”).
32. Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL LECTURES IN
ECONOMIC SCIENCES 11, 17 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997).
33. See Heller, supra note 25, at 1192 n.150 (“Since its first adoption by the Court in the
early 1940s, the bundle metaphor has been making upward progress in property cases to near
ubiquity.”). It should be noted that Heller and others have argued that the bundle of rights
view may not fully capture the nuance of property as an institution. See id. at 1188-89 (“In
particular, the idea of property as things misses the complex internal relations among owners
of a thing, while the modern bundle metaphor suggests more fluidity than appears in existing
property relations.”).
34. Merrill, supra note 31, at 754. 
35. See infra Part I.C.2.
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property,”36 some of these scholars in turn treat property as if it is
merely place.37 Each of these approaches, standing alone, is
insufficient. 
Complicating matters further, there is a third way to conceive of
property: as an institution that depends not on formal legal en-
titlements, but on social norms or social understandings.38 Scholars
like Robert Ellickson have shown that informal property norms and
customs are sometimes preferable to “legal” entitlements, and that,
at least under certain circumstances, people rely on social norms to
resolve “property” disputes rather than turning to the formal legal
system.39 People generally do not interfere with objects around
them, for example, even when they have no reason to fear legal
sanction.40 This is the pure social norm view of property. Sometimes,
however, seemingly informal property protections are based not on
social norms themselves, but on a misinterpretation of formal rules.
For example, if I shovel snow from a parking space, other people
might refrain from taking the space, not because they respect my
informal claim,41 but because they mistakenly believe that doing so
would violate a local ordinance. This amounts not to a social norm,
but to what might be called a social understanding—a view of
36. Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 617.
37. Zick himself does not fall into this trap—his account of “place” is broadly socio-legal.
See id. at 618-25.
38. Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity, and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v.
Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 26 (1997) [hereinafter Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity, and
Speech] (“[O]ne powerful strand of the American constitutional tradition treats property as
created by private actions alone.”); see also ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-
OPERATION, AND WELFARE 58-91 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing that property norms can emerge
through repeated interactions that create expectations about how others will behave in
resource disputes).
39. See ELLICKSON, supra note 25, at 167 (arguing that “members of a close-knit group
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that
members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another”); see also Richard H. McAdams,
The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 344 (1997) (“Order
Without Law created, or at least anticipated, a burgeoning new subfield of legal studies.”).
40. James Penner, whose book-length exploration of the nature of property is one of the
most thoughtful recent treatments of the subject, calls this the “duty of noninterference.”
PENNER, supra note 20, at 128; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To
Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
593, 612 (2008) (arguing that the right to exclude carries with it a corresponding duty to stay
away from owned resources). 
41. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S515, S528-29 (2002) [hereinafter Epstein, Allocation of Commons].
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property that is based on what a reasonable observer would perceive
formal rights to be. For example, a reasonable observer might
assume that the government owns a cross that stands in the middle
of a public park, even if in reality the small plot of land on which the
cross stands has been formally conveyed to a private party.42 By
focusing on the social norms and understandings that make the
institution of property function, this third conception demonstrates
not only that property is more than a physical thing, but also that
the institution of property depends on “informal” rules, both in
theory and in practice.
All three of these forms of property—things, legal rights, and
social norms—can be expressive, albeit in different ways and for
different reasons. Again, the Summum context is illustrative.
Certainly, the monuments—the things—at issue were expressive.43
And the city’s decision to formally exclude the Summum’s monu-
ment44—the city’s exercise of its legal rights—was also arguably
expressive, at least if one accepts that the city had such a right.
This second conception is somewhat fuzzier, however, because there
was no explicit disapproval of the Summum, at least not until
litigation began.45 The disapproval had to be inferred, which leads
to the third variation of property: the social norms or understand-
ings surrounding the park itself.46
2. Expression
Defining “expression”—or its siblings, “speech” and “communica-
tion,” which this Article will treat as triplets—is in many ways an
even more difficult project than defining property.47 My goal here is
42. See infra Part I.D.2.
43. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009).
44. Id. at 1130.
45. Id. The city denied the Summum’s requests on the grounds that “its practice was to
limit monuments in the park to those that ‘either directly relate[d] to the history of Pleasant
Grove or were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community.’”
Id.
46. See Timothy Zick, Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, BYU
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1687059 (discussing the expressiveness of the public forum itself).
47. See John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1338-39 (2008)
(“Everybody knows that communication is important, but nobody knows how to define it. The
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not to come up with a new definition,48 nor even to categorize
existing efforts, but simply to show that the kinds of expression
involved in the three conceptions of property discussed above have
First Amendment salience.49 
Because it is generally presumed that nearly every act of “expres-
sive” conduct falls within the scope of the First Amendment, the
simplest starting point for arguing that property-based expression
is covered by the First Amendment is to answer the objection that
it is not.50 Such an objection might involve two related points. First,
it could be that the exercise of property rights is not the kind of
“expressive conduct” that the First Amendment protects; in other
words, it is not a means of expression protected by the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court, after all, has rejected “the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”51 Second, one might argue that the
content of any message conveyed by the exercise of property rights
is not protected by the First Amendment. In other words, the First
best scholars refer to it. Free-speech law protects it.... But no one—no scholar or judge—has
successfully captured it. Few have even tried.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
48. Cf. id. at 1340 (arguing that “communication occurs when Person A tries to convey a
thought—some idea or feeling—to Person B, and Person B can freely choose whether to accept
that thought”).
49. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004)
(describing coverage and protections of the First Amendment). 
50. In order to give the objection its due, I will assume that some conduct is not expressive
enough to earn First Amendment protection, rather than falling back on the proposition,
endorsed by a majority of the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that no
“categories of expression” are beyond the scope of the First Amendment. Id. at 383. 
The question of what it means to be uncovered by the First Amendment is a surprisingly
complicated one. For more thoughtful discussions of the First Amendment’s scope, see
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Schauer, supra note 49; Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 269-72
(1981).
51. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that, despite the
defendant’s assertion that having a draft card was “symbolic speech,” the government could
punish knowing destruction or mutilation of such draft cards because the government had
sufficiently important interests to justify such “incidental limitations” on First Amendment
freedoms).
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Amendment is primarily concerned with protecting viewpoints52—
especially political ones53—not with preserving property rights. 
Both versions of the objection fail, however, because they
misjudge the expressiveness of property and the scope of the First
Amendment. The “means” objection fails because it is clear that the
First Amendment protects property-based “expressive conduct” as
diverse as burning a flag54 or draft card,55 publicizing computer
source code,56 operating an establishment that permits nude
dancing,57 marching in a parade,58 or even the simple act of exclud-
ing people or property from groups or places.59 For example, the
First Amendment—not just property law—protects a person’s de-
cision to accept or reject a campaign poster on her front lawn,60 or
a town’s decision to reject a monument in a public park.61 Even inert
“things” receive protection under the First Amendment whenever
they convey messages that are “direct, likely to be understood, and
within the contours of the First Amendment.”62 Of course, not every
incident of property or property-related action is “expressive,” just
52. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 613, 614 & n.33 (2008) (explaining that the “inviolable
rule of the First Amendment is that viewpoint discrimination is prohibited,” but noting that
“this rule is frequently broken”).
53. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (noting that regulation “operates at
the core of the First Amendment by prohibiting petitioners from engaging in classically
political speech”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.”).
54. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-06 (1989).
55. Cf. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (declining to resolve whether the communicative element
in burning a draft card was sufficient to “bring into play the First Amendment”).
56. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 448 (2d Cir. 2001).
57. City of Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).
58. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
59. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the First
Amendment right to freedom of association permitted Boy Scouts to exclude homosexual
members, despite state law forbidding such exclusion); see also Christian Legal Soc’y v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
60. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (holding that a “ban on almost all
residential signs violates the First Amendment”).
61. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009).
62. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974).
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as not every sound is constitutionally protected “speech.” The simple
registration of a land title, for example, may not be protected by the
First Amendment.63 Recognizing that some property is nonexpres-
sive, however, no more demonstrates that property falls outside the
First Amendment than recognizing that some sounds are nonexpres-
sive shows as much for speech. 
Nor does the second objection—that the content of property-based
expression falls outside the First Amendment—withstand scrutiny.
The right to exclude is often used to express viewpoints on race,64
religion,65 politics,66 and other topics at the heart of public discourse;
and even property-based speech that involves something less than
political viewpoints may still fall under the First Amendment’s
umbrella. Commercial speech, for example, is protected by the First
Amendment whether or not it expresses any particular political
viewpoint.67 And communicating the “idea” that I own my house is
not necessarily any less expressive than the advertisement of price
information and other speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.”68 If the expressive value of tobacco bill-
boards is constitutionally protected,69 it is difficult to see why the
communicative value of property ownership or specific uses of prop-
erty rights would not be.
Finally, it might be argued that the distinction between “en-
abling” and “being” expression is a false one: in either case, property
is simply “used” to convey an idea. The argument in Parts I.B, I.C,
63. Of course, in some circumstances title registration might be enormously
expressive—the first registration by an African American in a previously all-white
neighborhood, for example.
64. See infra Part II.C.2.
65. See infra Part II.C.3.
66. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (striking down ban that prevented
private property owner from posting antiwar sign).
67. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(holding that commercial speech is not “so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and from
‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government’” that it should be completely without protection) (internal
citations omitted).
68. Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)); see also Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the Definition of “Commercial
Speech,” 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 72 (referring to this as the “most often-repeated”
definition of commercial speech the Court has offered). 
69. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001).
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and I.D, however, is not dependent on the enabling/being distinc-
tion. The point is simply that property, no matter how it is con-
ceived, plays a crucial role in expression.70 Even so, it seems
reasonable to recognize a difference between excluding those who
would distort or interfere with one’s message (what this Article calls
“enabling” expression) and excluding others in order to signal dis-
approval of their message (“being” expression). When Pleasant
Grove excluded the Summum monument, for example, it both
protected its own preexisting message from being distorted by the
Summum and also signaled that it did not support the Summum’s
message. These are different expressive acts—one essentially de-
fensive, and the other affirmative. 
B. Property as a Place or Thing
1. Places and Things Enable Expression
This Section begins by analyzing property in its most colloquial
sense: a place or thing over which a person or entity has rights.71
Defined thusly, property clearly plays a prominent role in the means
of interpersonal expression and communication. We speak on and
through property, from computers and newspapers to bullhorns and
posters.72 Unsurprisingly, then, restrictions on things and places are
often recognized as restrictions on speech itself.73 Indeed, First
Amendment doctrine is built around uses of “property” as diverse as
70. Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory
State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (2008).
71. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1335-36 (giving second definition of
“property” as “[a]ny external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment
are exercised”).
72. Seidman, supra note 70, at 1543 (evaluating the proposition that “all speech requires
the use of some property,” finding “[f]or the most part, speech requires the use of a physical
object, whether it is a megaphone, paper and pen, a printing press, a television camera, or a
computer terminal”).
73. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the “failure to recognize ... that new types of
government property may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment
of our expressive activity”).
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newspapers,74 money,75 sound trucks,76 and leather jackets.77 These
and other cases illustrate at least one basic lesson: property, defined
in the simplest possible terms, enables speech. 
But aside from defending the idea of the public forum78 and
exploring the impact of intellectual property rights on free speech,79
scholars have generally given little direct attention to the impor-
tance of places and things in enabling speech. Fortunately, some
have begun to remedy this shortfall. In a recent and thoughtful
analysis of the relationship between property and speech, Michael
Seidman emphasizes the degree to which speech rights are depend-
ent on property rights: 
If it is true that economic entitlements, including most property
rights, are subject to political revision, and if it is true that there
is no right to use another’s property for speech, and if it is true
that speech requires property, then it cannot also be true that
speech rights are immune from political revision.80 
Others have similarly noted that would-be speakers must be able
to own the means of expression in order to ensure that their
expression is free and effective.81 And in a comprehensive series of
74. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83, 292 (1964) (giving citizens and
newspaper immunity from liability for nonmalicious misstatements of fact regarding public
officials). 
75. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (striking down
limitations on corporate political spending); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93,
252 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The right to speak would
be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are
the incidents of its exercise.”).
76. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81, 89 (1949) (upholding New Jersey ordinance that
barred sound amplification devices on “sound trucks”).
77. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that First Amendment limits
state’s ability to prosecute a person for wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft”
in a courthouse). 
78. See infra note 91. 
79. See generally LANGE & POWELL, supra note 22.
80. Seidman, supra note 70, at 1543.
81. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity, and Speech, supra note 38, at 52-53 (noting importance
of “rules that allow private individuals to own and operate their printing presses as they see
fit, or to conduct political meetings and rallies by invitation on private property”); see also
John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of First Amendment, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 49, 57 (1996). I confess that I do not know quite how to classify McGinnis’s vision
of “property” as it relates to speech. He argues for a “property-based system in which the First
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articles82 and accompanying book,83 Timothy Zick has persuasively
demonstrated that control over place is a powerful means of social
and political dominance, and that governments seeking to restrain
speech have often done so “through a variety of spatial tech-
niques.”84 In other words, governments regulate speech by regulat-
ing places and things.85 
The increasing scholarly concern with speech’s dependence on
property builds on decades-old (though recently growing) concerns
about threats to the public forum itself. As Part II.A explains in
more detail, the public forum is, as a formal matter, a kind of
government “property,” but private access to the public forum is
crucial to the marketplace of ideas. When the government sells or
closes places like public parks that “have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions,”86 avenues of private
expression are inevitably narrowed.87 If government property—that
is, the public forum—is not open to private individuals, then the free
speech “right” is essentially a matter of government grace. And as
the Court noted in the equally controversial context of habeas
protections at Guantanamo, if the government has an unlimited
right to “acquire, dispose of, and govern” public property, then it
may “switch the Constitution on or off at will.”88 The closing of the
public forum is not limited to the privatization of government-owned
Amendment simply protects the individual’s right to transmit his information,” suggesting
that the First Amendment is primarily concerned with individuals, rather than with
“collective ... self-governance.” Id. None of the versions of “property” discussed here are
dependent on the individual/collective self-governance division, and so I do not discuss
McGinnis’s work in any detail.
82. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1361 (2010) [hereinafter Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement]; Timothy Zick,
Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009) [hereinafter Zick,
Constitutional Displacement]; Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21.
83. ZICK, supra note 23.
84. Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 581. Zick recognizes that place is
more than an inert res. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
85. Cf. Seidman, supra note 70, at 1547 (“In order to give free speech rights content, ... the
Court must shield economic entitlements from political revision.”).
86. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
87. See Robert A. Sedler, Property and Speech, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 123, 127 (2006)
(noting that there is no First Amendment right to protest on another’s private property).
88. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
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land and other threats to the physical public square. Private ex-
pression is also limited by the government’s allocation or extension
of intellectual property rights such as copyrights.89 These rights, no
less than ownership of land, give property owners the power to limit
private speakers.90 
Whether First Amendment doctrine has kept pace with these
concerns is a difficult question. Many scholars have criticized the
Court’s public forum jurisprudence for not permitting sufficient
space for speech acts,91 and many more have criticized the expansion
of intellectual property rights as stifling expression without suffi-
cient gains in terms of increased incentives.92 Part II discusses
government speech and protection of the public forum, but it is far
beyond the scope of this Article to analyze these objections in any
depth. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that the strength
of these concerns illustrates the basic proposition that property
enables speech, or, to flip the equation, that speech requires prop-
erty. 
2. Things and Places Are Expressive
Of course, the fact that places and things enable expression does
not necessarily mean that they are themselves expressive. And yet
a closer analysis suggests that, even when defined simply as a thing
or place, property does have expressive value. 
Beginning with the lowest hanging fruit, it is surely uncontrover-
sial that “things” can be expressive. Posters, flags, billboards, flyers,
newspapers, and plays are all ownable things and are all expres-
sive. Far more interesting, and, for legal scholars, far more novel, is
the notion that place has expressive qualities. Although First
Amendment doctrine has yet to embrace this idea, philosophers,
anthropologists, geographers, and other nonlegal scholars have long
89. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (finding the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act constitutional despite plaintiffs’ objections on First Amendment grounds).
90. For a critical discussion of the right to exclude as it applies to sampling of songs, see
JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 122-59 (2008).
91. See, e.g., ZICK, supra note 23, at 168; Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public
Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998).
92. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891
(2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
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endorsed it.93 Aristotle himself recognized that “[t]he power of place
will be remarkable.”94 That “power,” later thinkers demonstrated,
shapes the way that people interact with one another95 and mani-
fests itself in the ways that places are themselves expressive.
Indeed, inasmuch as place “is actively produced by the interaction,
combination, and collision of laws, rules, norms of behavior, and
social practices,”96 it almost inevitably has expressive characteris-
tics. It is therefore unsurprising that geographers understand their
trade to encompass far more than mapping physical dimensions.
Geographer Robert Sack, for example, employs the concept of
“territoriality” to describe “the attempt by an individual or group to
affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships,
by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.”97 In
that same vein, sociologists and philosophers like Michel Foucault
have recognized that prisons and asylums are not just a means of
incapacitating the dangerous, but of “separating and branding” the
disfavored.98
A few legal scholars—especially those concerned with free speech
and the preservation of the public forum—have built on these
insights in recent years. Zick, for example, argues not only that the
public square must be preserved as a venue for expression,99 but
also that the government uses place (and related concepts like
“territory”) to express messages regarding punishment, purity, and
national identity.100 In his words: “Place, in other words, is not
93. I owe my familiarity with these nonlegal sources to Timothy Zick’s invaluable
exposition. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 617-30.
94. EDWARD S. CASEY, THE FATE OF PLACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY, at ix (1998), quoted
in Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 619.
95. See generally GEORG SIMMEL, The Sociology of Space, reprinted in SIMMEL ON
CULTURE: SELECTED WRITINGS 137 (David Frisby & Mike Featherstone eds., 1997). 
96. Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 622.
97. ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY 19 (1986),
quoted in Zick, Constitutional Displacement, supra note 82, at 518.
98. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 231 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 1979) (1977), quoted in Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 637;
Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content, and the Exigencies of War: American Prison Law
After Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 48 (1987) (noting that prisons “hold,
feed, shelter, accept, and release prisoners,” but also “beat, stab, rape, isolate, humiliate,
terrify, inspect, objectify, disable, demoralize, brutalize, and discipline” them).
99. See generally ZICK, supra note 23.
100. See Zick, Constitutional Displacement, supra note 82, at 515 (examining “the
intersection between territory and constitutional liberty”).
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merely an inert res. It is an expression of power, message, and
meaning.”101 Things and places therefore do not simply enable
expression; they are expression. How they come to be expressive,
however, is a more complicated story, one that requires analysis of
property rights and not just of place. The following Section under-
takes that analysis.
C. Property as a Legal Entitlement
Although the idea of property as a place or thing undoubtedly is
widely shared, “property” as a legal matter refers not to things but
to the formal bundle of rights governing their protection, use, and
transfer. Chief among these legal entitlements is the right to
exclude. Blackstone himself defined property as “that sole and
despotic dominion ... exercise[d] over the external things ... in total
exclusion of the right of any other.”102 Justice Holmes echoed this
definition when he wrote more than a century ago that “[t]he notion
of property ... consists in the right to exclude others from interfer-
ence with the more or less free doing with it as one wills.”103 And in
the one hundred years since then, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly reaffirmed Blackstone and Holmes’s conclusion that “[t]he
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most
treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”104 
Summing up and continuing this tradition, Merrill and others
argue that the right to exclude is not only the most important stick
in the bundle of property rights, but is actually the one necessary
stick.105 The right to exclude, in other words, is the sine qua non of
101. Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 588. 
102. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1979) (1766), quoted in Balganesh, supra note 40, at 596. 
103. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring). 
104. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); see also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (“In this case, we hold that the
‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.”)
(internal citations omitted); David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right To Exclude
Others from Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
39 (2000) (collecting and analyzing cases).
105. Merrill, supra note 31, at 730; see, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 13 (1996)
(defining property as including the right to exclude trespassers); PENNER, supra note 20, at
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property. The prominence of the right to exclude at the core of the
concept of “property” is all the more striking because, as noted
above,106 the basic definition of property has otherwise changed
dramatically over the years. In moving to a new understanding of
their subject matter, property scholars abandoned many of the
conceptions once thought essential to the very basis of the disci-
pline, including the primacy of state-backed protection.107 And yet
the right to exclude has generally survived the trip, and is an
increasingly important part of the modern view of property. The
following Sections evaluate its role in a formal regime; Part I.D
addresses in more detail the status and expressive nature of the
right to exclude in “informal” property regimes.
1. Legal Entitlements (Especially the Right To Exclude) Enable
Expression
Different sticks in the “bundle” of formal property rights enable
expression in different ways. Voluntary and continuous possession,
for example, can enable—or may even be—an ongoing act of ap-
proval. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[e]ven on private
property, signs and symbols are generally understood to express the
owner’s views.”108 Of course, a property owner (or apparent property
owner109) wishing to disassociate himself from what is (or appears
to be) in his possession may be able to do so through disclaimers.
For example, as discussed in more detail below,110 many public
landowners have attempted to avoid Establishment Clause chal-
lenges by erecting disclaimers around religious monuments. Such
disclaimers may or may not be effective, but the fact that landown-
ers often treat them as necessary demonstrates that possession
enables (or perhaps even is) expression. 
71 (same); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2009)
(noting that excludability has dominated property scholarship).
106. See supra Part I.A.1.
107. See infra Part I.D (describing view of property based on informal norms).
108. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
109. See infra Part I.D (discussing the difference between social norms and misunderstood
formal rules).
110. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing cases in which courts have found state action even
when the government lacks formal title to a piece of property).
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Even so, possession enables expression only when it is volitional,
or at least is perceived to be. In other words, my possession of some-
thing is generally unexpressive if I had no choice (and/or I am
generally understood to have had no choice) but to accept it. And
thus even the expressive power of possession is dependent on the
right to exclude—the right not to possess or, in the case of group
membership, not to include. Freedom of association, for example,
is premised in part on groups’ First Amendment right to protect
their “messages” by excluding those with whom they disagree.111
Excluding such people is both a means of protecting an association’s
message and an expressive act unto itself. 
The use of exclusion to protect messages, not simply to deliver
them, is important not just for associations but for all speakers. The
right to exclude allows a speaker to prevent his messages from being
distorted and thus to ensure that they are heard. This dynamic is at
work in many of the government speech cases addressed in Part II.
Those cases usually arise not simply because the government is
speaking, but because it seeks to exclude a private speaker whose
contrary message might be mistaken for the government’s.112 In
Summum, for example, the City of Pleasant Grove claimed that it
had to exclude the Summum monument in order to preserve its own
message.113 The same might be said of the government’s alleged ex-
pressive interest in denying public funding to health care providers
who distribute information about abortion,114 or to defense attorneys
who advocate government reform.115 In those cases, exclusion is
thought of as a means of enabling or protecting a preexisting mes-
sage. The government excludes in order to “ensure that its message
is neither garbled nor distorted.”116
111. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“There can be no clearer
example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire.”).
112. This is not always the case. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550
(2005), for example, involved a party’s attempt to avoid inclusion in a government message—a
publicly funded message supporting beef. Id. at 555-56.
113. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133-34 (2009).
114. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding regulations that prohibited
recipients of public funding from advocating, counseling, or referring patients for abortion).
115. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (reviewing public
funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys could make on behalf of
welfare claimants).
116. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
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There is also another functional way in which the right to exclude
enables expression: it permits a person to exclude others from
capturing the economic and other benefits flowing from her
expression. This, of course, is not simply the effect, but a primary
purpose, of intellectual property rights. The right to exclude others
from intellectual property is “deeply functional”117 and is generally
understood, at least in the American system, as necessary to in-
centivize creative and expressive activity (and not, for example, to
protect the “moral rights” of creators).118 Without the power to
exclude others from his creation, a property owner would not have
the power to profit from it and would therefore have less incentive
to create it in the first place. 
Thus, like places and things, the right to exclude enables speech,
albeit for different and, in some sense, “opposite” reasons. In the
cases discussed in Part I.B.1, speech depends on access to a place
—speakers need not be excluded from a public forum. The right to
exclude, by contrast, enables expression by allowing property
owners to prevent access—protecting their messages from being
distorted or stolen by others. 
2. The Right To Exclude Is Expressive
Property scholarship celebrates the functional nature of the right
to exclude, but generally has not addressed its expressive dimen-
sion. Instead, as Shyam Balganesh notes, “courts and scholars have
developed a view that identifies property’s right to exclude as
meaning little more than an entitlement to injunctive relief against
a continuing (or repeated) interference with a resource.”119 In other
117. Balganesh, supra note 40, at 629 (“[T]he use of the right to exclude in the patent
statute begins to appear logical and deeply functional.”). 
118. See John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing
Judges from Aesthetic Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros.,
12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301, 324 (2005) (noting that the United States conceptualizes
“economic rights in copyright,” whereas European countries more commonly recognize “artists’
moral rights”). But see BOYLE, supra note 90, at 27 (“Even in the droits d’auteur countries,
which have a markedly different copyright law regime, [the utilitarian view] largely holds for
their patent and trademark law systems, and utilitarian strands suffuse even ‘the sacred
rights of authors.’”). 
119. Balganesh, supra note 40, at 595; see also id. at 595-96 (criticizing the view that
“attributes to the right an entirely consequentialist meaning, under which the right—and
indeed all of property—is normatively meaningless except when sought to be enforced in a
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words, the right to exclude is generally seen as instrumental,
lacking its own independent expressive or social meaning. 
And yet the inclusion or exclusion of a person or thing can itself
be an expressive act, as the law of expressive association demon-
strates. The precise justification, nature, and scope of associational
rights is debatable,120 but it is clear that the Supreme Court has
“long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.”121 Although right-to-
association cases are generally not treated as involving “property,”122
the very fact that they so easily transform exclusion into expression
demonstrates quite clearly the close relationship between speech
and the right to exclude. The interests behind expressive association
can be conceptualized in at least two ways: as a right of the
individual to join associations,123 and as a right of associations to
manage their membership.124 Although the former is important and
constitutionally protected,125 it is the latter that truly casts light on
the expressive nature of the right to exclude. It can in turn be
divided into two concepts: enabling a group’s expression, that is,
protecting its message, and being a form of expression. 
On the one hand, groups may seek to exclude those who do not
share—or would distort—their messages. In Christian Legal Society
v. Martinez, for example, the Christian Legal Society (CLS) at
Hastings Law School sought to exclude those students who would
court of law”).
120. See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 606-11
(2010) (criticizing the shift to a right of “association” rather than “assembly”); John D. Inazu,
The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 (2010)
(criticizing the distinction between “expressive” and “intimate” association).
121. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
122. ZICK, supra note 23, at 8.
123. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Joining
is one method of expression.”).
124. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its
Workers’ Speech To Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 41 (2009) (“A growing body
of social science supports courts’ intuition that an organization’s association with individuals
engaged in certain speech can communicate a message that may undermine—or further—the
organization’s ability to communicate its own views effectively.”). 
125. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (noting that the right of
association “includes the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership in a
group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means”).
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not pledge adherence to the group’s core religious principles.126
Hastings determined that, because these principles would exclude
homosexuals, the requirement would violate a school policy that
required student groups to admit all comers,127 and so denied CLS
various benefits extended to other student organizations.128
Whatever the merits of the other legal issues in the case, CLS’s
exclusion of homosexuals was undoubtedly expressive.129 It both
“protected” the group’s preexisting expression and sent a separate
but effective message of disapproval. Recognizing this, the Court
analyzed the all-comers policy as a restriction on CLS’s speech, and
upheld it in part because the group was not forced to give up its
right to exclude: “CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it
forgoes the benefits of official recognition.”130
Similarly, homeowners have the right to exclude campaign post-
ers from their front lawns. If someone declines to exclude a particu-
lar poster, despite having a right and opportunity to do so, she has,
barring any unusual indications to the contrary, signaled approval
of it. As Justice Stevens noted in a prominent Establishment Clause
case, “[T]he location of a stationary, unattended sign generally is
both a component of its message and an implicit endorsement of
that message by the party with the power to decide whether it may
be conveyed from that location.”131 In the same case, Justice Souter
argued that a person watching an individual speak in a public
forum will attribute the speech to the speaker, whereas a person
observing “an unattended display [and any message it conveys]” will
attribute its message “to the owner of the land on which it
stands.”132 Thus, intentional inclusion expresses not only the mes-
sage of the included thing—for example, the campaign poster’s pro-
candidate message—but also the message of the includer.133 The
126. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010).
127. Id. at 2979. The Court explicitly declined to consider whether it would reach the same
result under the school’s nondiscrimination policy. Id. at 2984 n.10.
128. Id. at 2981.
129. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It would be
hard to argue—and no one does—that CLS is not an expressive association.”).
130. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
131. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 801 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring). 
133. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994) (“Displaying a sign from one’s own
residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else,
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right to exclude—the right to reject, as well as the ability to accept
—allows the property owner to express a message. Indeed, inclusion
is expressive only to the extent that exclusion is expressive, and vice
versa.
The precise content of a message will of course depend on context.
Inclusions generally denote approval, and exclusions disapproval,
but this will not always be the case. Nor, in many cases, will it be
easy to distinguish one from the other. When the State “includes”
people in jails, for example, it does not necessarily signal approval
of them. Nor does the State communicate approval by restricting
political protest to “free speech zones,” even when those are located
on government property.134 For that matter, the State does not
necessarily communicate anything at all by excluding, or declining
to exclude, private speakers from public forums. Thus, it is gener-
ally true that “[t]hrough the edifice of place, the state communicates
something about the nature and character of those inside to those
who remain outside,”135 but that “something” will vary according to
the precise method of inclusion/exclusion and the social context in
which it is embedded. And, of course, it might be said with equal
accuracy that a prisoner is “included” in a prison, or that he is
“excluded” from the outside world. This demonstrates that the right
to exclude—the right to control someone else’s access to a particular
place or thing—and not simply exclusion itself, is the heart of
expression.
It must be noted, however, that there are some situations in
which exclusion and inclusion do not express, or at least are not
intended to express, anything at all. For example, some speakers
may simply be physically or otherwise crowded out—that is,
excluded—by others. If one person builds a monument on a par-
ticular corner of a public park, others are effectively precluded from
or conveying the same text or picture by other means.... [T]he identity of the speaker is an
important component of many attempts to persuade. A sign advocating ‘Peace in the Gulf ’ in
the front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction
than the same sign in a 10-year-old child’s bedroom window or the same message on a bumper
sticker of a passing automobile.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
134. See, e.g., James J. Knicely & John W. Whitehead, The Caging of Free Speech in
America, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005); Nick Suplina, Note, Crowd
Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, Political Demonstrations, and
Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 396 (2005).
135. Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 21, at 637 (emphasis added).
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doing the same. Part II.B.2 argues that such incompatibility is not
by itself expressive. In fact, incompatibility does not even involve
the invocation of the “right” to exclude; it is a law of physics rather
than a constitutional rule.136
Even when the right to exclude has been invoked, some reasons
for exclusion are—or at least are intended to be—nonexpressive. I
might reject a campaign poster in an effort to reduce clutter, for
example, or accept it because I like its colors or want to use it as a
window shade. I might even flatly refuse to accept any political
propaganda in an effort to express nothing at all except, perhaps,
my opposition to political propaganda.137 Such reasons are, at least
from the perspective of the person invoking them, value- and
viewpoint-neutral, and in that sense unexpressive in the same way
that a time, place, and manner restriction on speech is “content-
neutral.”138 
But these exclusions are nonexpressive only from the point of
view of the person with the right to exclude—from the “speaker’s”
perspective, in other words, rather than the listener’s. A stranger
who sees a political poster in my window will almost certainly
conclude that it is there because I endorse the candidate, not be-
cause I am using it as a window shade. From this perspective, the
expressiveness of an exclusion or inclusion has nothing to do with
the intentions of the person who has exercised or declined to
exercise the right to exclude, and instead depends on whether that
person appears to have engaged in expressive exclusion or inclusion. 
Just as endorsement-by-inclusion can occur even when a party
has not intended to communicate anything at all, an inclusion can
also express a message contrary to what the property owner intends.
This situation could happen when the right to exclude is limited,
136. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
137. Cf. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985)
(upholding the government’s decision to limit participation in the Combined Federal
Campaign “to avoid the appearance of political favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of
the excluded groups”); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974)
(suggesting that the government may flatly reject various forms of politically expressive
speech because of the government’s interest in avoiding “lurking doubts about favoritism”).
138. I do not mean here to take a position on whether there is indeed such a thing as a
content-neutral speech restriction, only to suggest that some reasons for exclusion may not
themselves be intentionally expressive. The classic discussion of content neutrality remains.
See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
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for example, by antidiscrimination laws prohibiting a group from
excluding others.139 In one sense, such forced inclusions are simply
unexpressive: if a group has no control over who joins it, then it has
no ability to willfully express anything through its membership. But
perhaps by being forced to include unwanted members, groups are
not simply prevented from expressing their chosen messages, but
are in fact forced to express messages they do not support. That,
after all, was the essence of the Boy Scouts’ claim in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale—not only that having a gay scoutmaster would
distort the Scouts’ stance on homosexuality, but also that it would
force the Scouts to project an acceptance of homosexuality that they
did not support.140 Limitations on the right to exclude therefore both
compel and limit speech.
Exclusion almost inevitably communicates something—usually
incompatibility, if not outright inferiority—about those whom are
excluded, and thus about those whom are included. Ascribing ex-
pressive impact to an involuntary inclusion or exclusion inevitably
means asking whether observers would construe the inclusion as
voluntary. But does such an observer-focused view mean abandon-
ing the notion of property altogether? The next Section argues that
it does not and that social meanings are sometimes more important
than legal entitlements when it comes to understanding property
and its expressive impact.
D. “Informal” Property as Social Norms or Understandings
Over the past twenty years, much property-related scholarship
has argued that sometimes “property” is neither a place nor a for-
mal right, but rather a social norm or understanding.141 Although
139. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 654 (2000) (concluding that being forced
to include a homosexual “assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy
Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs”).
140. Id. at 655-56 (“The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an
assistant scoutmaster’s uniform sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a
heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.”).
141. See ELLICKSON, supra note 25, at 123; Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s
No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) (arguing that
comedians have evolved a system of social norms to incentivize and protect their productions
rather than rely on a system of formal intellectual property); see also Emmanuelle Fauchart
& Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19
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this account of “informal” property has been largely successful as
both a descriptive and a normative matter, it further complicates
efforts to describe the relationship between property and expression.
The difficulty arises in part because the notion of informal
property is itself so complex. On the one hand, Ellickson and other
scholars have demonstrated that property rights are often defined
and enforced through informal mechanisms that are totally
independent of state laws and sanctions.142 Indeed, “as David Hume
first suggested, conventions of property may slowly emerge from an
iterated process that creates a pattern of expectations of how people
will behave in resource disputes.”143 I call this the social norm view,
which treats property as existing entirely apart from formal rules. 
In practice, however, informal understandings may not be easy
to separate from formal legal entitlements. If, for example,
informal property rights are not based on social norms, but rather
on mistaken impressions about whom has formal ownership,
then the social view begins to collapse into the formal one. I call
this the social understanding view of property. For example, in
Establishment Clause cases, courts have found government involve-
ment when religious iconography was located on private property
but appeared to be owned by the government.144 In such cases, the
expressive value comes not from social norms, but from misunder-
standings about formal rights. As the Supreme Court emphasized
in Summum: “[B]ecause property owners typically do not permit the
construction of such monuments [conveying a message with which
the property owners do not wish to be associated], persons who
observe donated monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret
ORG. SCI. 187 (2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006); Mark F. Schultz, Fear
and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People To
Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006).
142. See supra note 141.
143. Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory,
and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 246 (2009) (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 490 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739)).
144. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3; see also Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 783 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“Even a less informed reasonable observer would perceive governmental
endorsement of the message, given that ‘[n]ational parklands and preserves embody the
notion of government ownership,’ that the Sunrise Rock area is used as a public campground,
and finally, because of the ‘the ratio of publicly-owned to privately-owned land in the
Preserve.’”).
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them as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.”145
If the observer reasonably though incorrectly believes a piece of
property to be owned by a particular party, then she will also
reasonably but erroneously attribute any expression arising from
that property to that apparent owner.
The line between the social norm and social understanding
approaches is undoubtedly fuzzy. But for the purposes of this
Article, it makes little difference whether any particular case falls
on one side of that line or the other. Either way, the point is simply
that property, however conceived, both enables expression and is
expressive.
1. Social Norms and Understandings Enable Expression
Part I.C.1 argued at length that the right to exclude—the most
important right in the bundle of formal property entitlements
—facilitates speech by permitting speakers to protect and maintain
control of their expression.146 It would seem to follow that if “infor-
mal” property has a similar enabling function, it should rest on an
informal version of the right to exclude. 
At first glance, it is unclear how the right to exclude fits into the
vision of property as an informal system of social relations. If I have
only informal ownership over a piece of property, I generally cannot
call on formal enforcement mechanisms to protect it. The police will
not help me eject a “trespasser” from land I do not officially own.
And yet the right to exclude is generally thought to be the sine qua
non of property.147 If the right to exclude does not exist in informal
property regimes, then the very concept of informal “property”
would be a misnomer, and Ellickson and other scholars would be
wrong to suggest that they are studying property at all.
Fortunately, on closer examination, it seems that the right to
exclude does indeed exist in “informal” property regimes. It follows
that informal rights holders can use their powers of exclusion in
expressive ways, just like those with “formal” rights to exclude. For
example, Person A may be able to effectively exclude Person B if she
145. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009).
146. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
147. See Merrill, supra note 31, at 730.
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can successfully capitalize on B’s misunderstanding that a place or
thing formally belongs to her. Inasmuch as this approach—bluffing,
essentially—relies on the excluded party’s misconception that
Person A actually has formal title to the property, it does not
necessarily show that social norms have any independent influence
of their own. Person B may acquiesce because he unnecessarily fears
state-backed sanctions, not because he respects some shared social
norm that the property is rightfully Person A’s and should not be
disturbed. This conceptualization is the social understanding view
of informal property.148
But there may also be situations in which, rather than mistak-
enly thinking that someone has formal title, the excluded party
simply does not know or does not care. In such a case, social norms
provide both “rights” independent of the legal system and informal
enforcement mechanisms.149 These mechanisms can be just as
efficient and effective as formal legal proceedings, for example,
when it comes to creating a recognized right to return to a parking
space from which one has shoveled snow.150 Moreover, as Balganesh
has argued at length, the right to exclude implies a corresponding
duty to stay away from an ownable resource.151 Inasmuch as that
duty has been internalized, the right to exclude may be effectuated
even when no state-backed sanctions are threatened, or available.
People tend to effectively exclude themselves from property that
they know is not theirs.152 Thus, even without a formal legal right,
property owners may still be able to exclude others. That power to
exclude in turn enables expression for all the same reasons as the
formal exclusionary right.153
148. See supra text accompanying note 144.
149. Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms To Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1877 (2009) (“[N]orms qua patterns of social behavior typically have
sanctions attached, and conformity to them is typically prescribed by one person to another,
although these characteristics are not essential.”).
150. See Epstein, Allocation of Commons, supra note 41, at S528-29.
151. Balganesh, supra note 40, at 600 (arguing that the right to exclude “is best understood
as a normative device, which derives from the norm of resource inviolability”). 
152. PENNER, supra note 20, at 128 (describing this behavior as a “duty of
noninterference”); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1852 (2007) (describing “duties of abstention”).
153. See supra Part I.C.
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2. Social Norms and Understandings of Property Are Expressive
Although the precise nature of informal property may be some-
what fuzzy, one thing is clear: it is expressive, perhaps even in-
nately so. Indeed, because norms are essentially social practices,154
it is almost inevitable that they are expressive.
Consider again the situation of the property owners or expressive
associations discussed in Part I.C.2—specifically, those whose
formal right to exclude has been limited, for example, by an antidis-
crimination statute.155 As noted above, such nonexclusion rules
make it more difficult for associations or individuals to express their
preferred messages.156 But limitations on the right to exclude may
also effectively compel groups to express messages they do not
support. In Dale, for example, the Supreme Court found that re-
quiring the Boy Scouts to comply with a New Jersey law that
prohibited discrimination against gays and lesbians would have
“force[d] the organization to send a message, both to the youth
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct.”157
If expression is defined based on audience impact, the relevant
question is not whether a particular property owner actually has the
right to exclude as a formal matter, but whether he is perceived as
having such a right. If, prior to Dale, the general public did not
know that state law required the Boy Scouts to include gay scout-
masters, then the Scouts could rightly say that they were being
forced to communicate a message of approval that they did not
support. On the other hand, if the general public understood that
the Scouts had no choice but to admit homosexuals—that is, no
right to exclude—then the inclusion might not be seen as volitional,
much less as an expression of approval.158 Thus, a well-known and
154. See Hetcher, supra note 149, at 1877 (“Norms are best viewed not as linguistic entities
but rather as social practices of a certain sort (albeit ones that typically have linguistic
entities attached).”).
155. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
156. See supra Part I.C.2.
157. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (holding that Boy Scouts had a
First Amendment right to exclude homosexual scoutmasters, notwithstanding New Jersey
antidiscrimination law to the contrary).
158. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 603 (2001) (“[T]he Boy Scouts easily could proclaim to the world
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broadly enforced rule forcing groups to accept unwanted members
would, perhaps counterintuitively, harm the groups’ expressive
interests less than a narrower and less well-known principle.159
After all, no one would have mistaken as an expression of accep-
tance or approval Southern schools’ grudging enrollment of black
students following Brown v. Board of Education,160 Brown II,161 and
the countless other cases in which Southern schools and politicians
were ordered to comply with the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause.162 
* * *
Disaggregating the idea of property helps illuminate the various
ways in which “property”—whether conceived of as a place or thing,
a legal entitlement, or a social norm or understanding—enables
expression or is itself expressive. But illuminating property’s many
facets also casts light on an underappreciated problem: those
facets sometimes reflect in different directions. This situation
happens, for example, when the government, aware that it is either
violating the Constitution or is in danger of doing so, conveys a piece
of property to a private party in order to avoid constitutional
obligations.163 Although such transactions may effectuate a formal
transfer of land, albeit sometimes with the possibility of reverter or
reversion to the government,164 they do not necessarily change a
that it is anti-gay and that it was accepting gay scoutleaders, like James Dale, because the
law required it to do so. In other words, the Boy Scouts could use the forced inclusion of
homosexuals as the occasion for making clear its anti-gay message, and that the inclusion of
Dale was a result of legal compulsion and not a matter of condoning his sexual orientation.”).
159. This is not to say that other associational interests—those akin to privacy or
autonomy—would not be harmed, only that any interference with the “message” sent by the
group to the outside world would be minimal. 
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregated schools violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
161. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring schools to be desegregated
with “all deliberate speed”). 
162. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 34 (1959) (recognizing that “integration forces an association upon those for whom it is
unpleasant or repugnant”). See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007) (discussing Brown and its impact).
163. For a thorough account of this phenomenon, see Zick, Constitutional Displacement,
supra note 82, at 604 (describing state efforts to avoid constitutional claims and concerns by
privatizing property, and arguing that such efforts must comply with constitutional covenants
that run with the property and may even bind successors in interest); see also Tebbe, supra
note 6 (discussing the use of private-law arrangements to avoid public-law obligations). 
164. See, e.g., Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J.,
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reasonable observer’s understanding of whom owns the property—it
probably still appears to be government-owned. In other words, the
transactions do not alter the social understanding of ownership.
How is one to make sense of the “expression” in such a case?
No simple answers exist. Part II attempts to advance the inquiry
by addressing some of the problems that arise when conceptions of
property diverge in cases involving government property and
government expression. Focusing on formal property rights in those
cases would allow the government to effectively “hide” unconstitu-
tional government expression by privatizing troublesome corners of
the public square. But employing a reasonable observer test—that
is, focusing on informal property—would bring private property
owners within the ambit of constitutional restrictions. Inevitably,
then, making sense of government property and government expres-
sion requires a vision of property itself.
II. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION 
The property/expression interface explored in Part I is important
throughout First Amendment theory and doctrine, but it is espe-
cially crucial in the context of government property and government
speech. If the government’s exercise of its property rights is char-
acterized as government expression, then it is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny under government speech doctrine. But if it is
characterized as the exclusion of an unwanted speaker from a public
forum, then it may be subject to the highest levels of scrutiny under
traditional forum analysis.165 The line between government speech
and the public forum cannot be drawn based simply on formal
property rights, because public forums are almost always govern-
dissenting) (noting that “the government retained a reversionary interest in the property”);
Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding state action in a case in which a
city had donated a hospital to a private board, and noting that “[p]erhaps the most significant
evidence of the state’s involvement in the hospital’s affairs is the presence of the reverter
clause in the deed”); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 320-22 (5th Cir. 1962)
(finding state action following the sale of two public golf courses to private parties because of
the existence of a reversionary clause that effectively gave the government “complete present
control” over the property).
165. See Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government
Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (2004) (describing this dichotomy).
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ment owned.166 The question of government speech is therefore
intertwined with, not defined by, the scope of the government’s
property rights.
This problem is both difficult and important because “cases in
which government invokes the government-speech defense almost
always implicate government property or instrumentalities.”167
Summum, of course, involved the placement of monuments in a
public park.168 Other leading government speech cases have also
involved the expressive use of government property, whether
physical or not: Rust v. Sullivan involved the exclusion of certain
health care providers from a government funding program;169 Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the exclusion of defense lawyers from
public funding;170 and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the
inclusion of beef producers in a government-run advertising pro-
gram.171 In resolving these cases, the Court has emphasized the
expressive nature of government property and government property
rights. And, as explained in Part I, it is surely true that property
—however conceived—can be deeply expressive.
But in the context of government property, this is the right
answer to the wrong question. The issue is not whether excluding
an unwanted speaker is an expressive act—it surely is, or at least
can be—but rather whether the government has the right to exclude
in the first place. The Court starts its analysis in cases like
Summum from the wrong place, by assuming that the government
has a right to exclude, and then asking whether that right has been
used in an expressive way. Instead, courts must ask the more
fundamental and important question of whether the government has
that right. The first principle of the First Amendment, after all, is
that public property owners may not engage in certain types of
166. This is so, of course, because of the state action requirement. Private property owners
generally do not own public forums in the First Amendment sense because private parties are
almost never bound by the Amendment at all.
167. Lilia Lim, Comment, Four-Factor Disaster: Courts Should Abandon the Circuit Test
for Distinguishing Government Speech from Private Speech, 83 WASH. L. REV. 569, 571 (2008);
see also Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 572.
168. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
169. 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
170. 531 U.S. 533, 534 (2001).
171. 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
1450 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1413
exclusion—that based on viewpoint, for example.172 This is the very
idea of the public forum.
In an effort to resolve the mess, this Part unpacks the relation-
ship between government property and government speech. Part
II.A analyzes the public forum as a type of government property in
light of the principles articulated in Part I. It demonstrates that
public forum analysis has moved away from reliance on the govern-
ment’s formal property rights and toward a focus on social under-
standings of the forum, which are manifested in the fact that the
public forum is defined based on its “character” rather than on
whom holds title to it. Parts II.B and II.C consider the other side of
the coin—government speech—and ask why and under what con-
ditions the government’s right to exclude should be considered
“expressive.” One common rationale for government speech’s First
Amendment exemption is that the government must make “expres-
sive” decisions when managing scarce or incompatible resources.173
Part II.B, however, argues that, just as incompatibility itself is not
an expressive form of exclusion, management of incompatibility
need not be expressive. Finally, Part II.C considers the possibility
of an “endorsement test” approach to government speech. Such an
approach would effectively mean following the informal conception
of property to its logical conclusion, harmonizing government
property and government speech by judging both according to what
a reasonable observer would perceive them to be. 
A. The Public Forum as Government Property
The development of the public forum is essentially a century-long
erosion of the government’s right to exclude.174 In the early cases,
172. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.”).
173. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998) (holding
that it would be “simply inconceivable” to require scarce arts funding to be allocated in a
neutral manner); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998)
(holding that public forum principles do not generally apply to a public television station’s
editorial judgments). 
174. Cf. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1406 (2001) (“In its origin, and perhaps even in its most characteristic
form, the public forum doctrine was an exception to government control of its own property.”).
2011]     GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH 1451
courts treated the government, like any other property owner, as
having an unlimited power to exclude unwanted speakers. As Oliver
Wendell Holmes put it when he was a justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, “For the Legislature absolutely or condi-
tionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no
more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”175
Holmes’s future colleagues on the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed both
his holding and his basic conception of government property: “The
right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes the
authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be
availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser.”176 Under this
view, there was no need to determine whether the government
“expressed” anything by excluding unwanted speakers. Because
there could be no First Amendment claim against the government
for exclusion from government property, the government’s property
rights were enough to settle the matter, as is the case today for
owners of private property.
For the most part,177 public forum doctrine has been premised on
a gradual rejection of Holmes’s early view. Perhaps the clearest
statement of the change came in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, in which the Court explained that, “wherever the title
of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions.”178
By signaling the relevance of a forum’s character and tradition,
and by declaring ambivalence about “[w]here[ ] the title ... may rest,”
Hague’s famous statement about the public forum rejected the
175. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) (upholding conviction of public
speaker who delivered speech on Boston Common without a proper permit), aff’d sub nom.
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897); see also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (“Like any other owner, [Congress] may provide when, how, and to whom
its land can be sold.”). 
176. Davis, 167 U.S. at 48 (emphasis added).
177. Although public forum doctrine indicates otherwise, the Court has occasionally
suggested that the government has the same exclusion rights as private property owners. See,
e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (“The State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.”).
178. 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (emphasis added). 
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formalist conception of the forum as public property and moved
towards a conception based instead on social norms and understand-
ings. Scholars embraced and elaborated that approach. Harry
Kalven’s massively influential179 article, The Concept of the Public
Forum, argued for recognition of a “First-Amendment easement” to
certain publicly owned places.180 Kalven claimed that such ease-
ments had in fact already been implicitly recognized by Civil-Rights-
Era cases like Cox v. Louisiana.181 Easements, of course, are the
language of formal property, but Kalven’s easement did not depend
on notice, privity, registration, and the other prerequisites of a
formal easement.182 Rather, he employed the language of formal
property to describe what was essentially a social understanding,
which in turn amounted to a very real limitation on the govern-
ment’s formal power to exclude. 
These changing concepts of the public forum did not alter the
government’s formal ownership rights; the government did not
lose title to public lands. Yet it was, and is, clear that, contrary to
the Supreme Court’s statement in Davis, “the greater power” of ex-
cludability that generally inheres in a property right does not
“contain[ ] the lesser” power to exclude on the basis of viewpoint.
This is true even if the government must in some sense retain the
authority to sell or close a public forum.183 Thus, although the Court
has recognized the government’s right “to preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,”184 it
has simultaneously stated a “key caveat: any access barrier must be
179. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis:
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1221-22 (1984)
(noting Kalven’s influence on dozens of Supreme Court decisions). 
180. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 13, 26-27. 
181. 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (overturning, on First Amendment grounds, conviction for
engaging in demonstration outside courthouse).
182. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 671-709 (6th ed. 2006) (describing creation
of easements).
183. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897); see Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699-700 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (“The Constitution grants Congress and the
President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when
and where its terms apply.”).
184. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (quoting
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
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reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”185 The implications of this
change were enormous. Indeed, if the right to exclude is the sine qua
non of property, then it would seem that the development of the
public forum stripped the government of property just as surely as
if its formal title had been shredded. As Merrill explains, “Give
someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a
resource that is scarce relative to the human demand for it, and you
give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do
not have property.”186 At the very least, the public forum doctrine
severely limits that right. 
The public forum is therefore not coterminous with those things
and places over which the government has a formal legal entitle-
ment. Just as the public forum does not encompass all government
property, it has not always been limited to it, either. Occasionally,
private property rights have been abrogated in the name of pro-
tecting the public forum.187 In those cases, as in the racial segrega-
tion and Establishment Clause cases discussed below,188 courts have
looked beyond property ownership as a formal matter and consid-
ered the social norms and understandings surrounding it. In his
concurring opinion in Marsh v. Alabama, which extended First
Amendment rights to would-be speakers in a privately owned com-
pany town, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Title to property as defined by State law controls property
relations; it cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise
precisely because a company town is a town as well as a conge-
ries of property relations. And similarly the technical distinc-
tions on which a finding of “trespass” so often depends are too
tenuous to control decision regarding the scope of the vital
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.189
185. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010). 
186. Merrill, supra note 31, at 730.
187. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (upholding First Amendment
claims on privately owned land); see also Paul E. McGreal, The Case for a Constitutional
Easement Approach to Permanent Monuments in Traditional Public Forums, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 185, 197 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/
41/LRColl2008n41McGreal.pdf. 
188. See infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.3.
189. 326 U.S. 501, 511 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
1454 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1413
The Court has generally moved away from Marsh in cases involving
physical property like malls, and thus it is true that private title
generally trumps would-be speakers’ access rights.190 But as the
cases discussed in Part II.C demonstrate, the Court has sometimes
restricted private property rights in the name of the First Amend-
ment, and has occasionally upheld abridgements of private property
owners’ rights to exclude, for example, by approving the fairness
requirement in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.191
So if the boundaries of the public forum cannot be established by
determining which party has the formal right to exclude, how can
those boundaries be defined? And based on what conception of
“property”? Holmes’s early view that the government’s right to
exclude unwanted speakers is akin to that of the “owner of a private
house,” and includes “[t]he right to absolutely exclude all right to
use,”192 clearly imagines property as a formal legal entitlement in
line with the conception of property discussed in Part I.C above. But
Hague dispelled that notion by turning attention away from the
question of where “the title of streets and parks may rest.”193
Instead, Hague essentially adopted the property-as-social under-
standings approach described in Part I.D. Under that view, vesting
property rights in the government is not sufficient (nor even
necessary) to demonstrate the existence of a public forum.194 As the
190. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-21 (1976) (overturning Logan Valley and
upholding a mall owner’s right to exclude picketers); Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319 (1968) (bringing shopping malls
within the Marsh rule); Seidman, supra note 70, at 1550, 1565 (noting that the Supreme
Court “has sharply constrained the reach of the constitutional theory” underlying the Marsh
line of cases, but Marsh’s “approach continue[s] to influence some corners of free speech
jurisprudence”).
191. 395 U.S. 367, 367 (1969); cf. Seidman, supra note 70, at 1567 (comparing Red Lion and
Dale, and concluding that “[i]n both cases, one entity (Red Lion or BSA) ‘owns’ property (a
television license or the Boy Scouts), and in both cases the government provides someone else
(someone taking advantage of the fairness doctrine or Dale) access to the property so that the
nonowner can engage in expressive activity opposed by the owner”).
192. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897); see also supra notes 174-75 and
accompanying text.
193. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
194. Cf. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114,
1122, 1123 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “a deed does not insulate government action
from constitutional review,” and that determining whether a public easement constituted a
public forum would depend on “the characteristics of the easement, the practical
considerations of applying forum principles, and the particular context the case presents”).
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Supreme Court has explained, “the First Amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or con-
trolled by the government.”195 And as the Marsh line demonstrates,
access is not automatically denied if the property is private. Instead,
“[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and the
standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated
differ depending on the character of the property at issue.”196
That “character,” in turn, is defined by looking to the prior use, or
nonuse, of the right to exclude. If, over time, the government
declines to exercise that right, it creates a “tradition” of openness,
which denotes the existence of a public forum, which in turn
precludes further exercise of the right to exclude no matter who
actually holds the formal legal entitlement to do so. On the other
hand, a tradition of exclusion denotes a nonpublic forum, from
which the government remains largely free to exclude private
speakers.197 If the government fails to exercise its right to exclude,
it does not lose its formal ownership over a piece of land; it is not
divested of title. And yet, in the eyes of the public, the character of
the property has changed. The right to exclude no longer has the
legitimacy it once did. Indeed, because the public forum has crept
even onto private property, notions of informal property have in
many cases effectively trumped formal property rights. 
This is a descriptive observation, not a doctrinal prescription. It
is not easy to build doctrine around the idea that the government’s
right to exclude is an informal property right, defined by social
understandings about the “tradition” and “character” of a forum. As
Robert Post has forcefully argued, “[t]he Court’s present focus ‘on
the character of the property at issue’ is a theoretical dead end,
because there is no satisfactory theory connecting the classification
of government property with the exercise of First Amendment
rights.”198 If nothing else, there is a certain circularity in saying that
195. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
196. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (emphasis
added).
197. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (holding
that regulations on speech in nonpublic forums are acceptable so long as they “are reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral”).
198. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1777 (1987) (criticizing the tradition-based approach)
(internal footnotes omitted).
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the government’s authority to regulate speech in a public forum is
dependent on how much the government has regulated speech in
that forum in the past. 
The purpose of this Part is not to put forward a new theory of the
public forum, but simply to show that the development of public
forum doctrine represents a move away from the formal property-as-
legal entitlement view—that is, that the government can exclude
speakers from land over which it holds title—and toward something
approaching a property-as-social relations view—that is, that the
government’s right to exclude is based on the “character” of a place.
The practical impact of this shift has been to remove the right to
exclude from the government’s bundle of property rights, or at least
to greatly limit it.199 
Decades after Hague and its progeny took that right away,
however, it has returned in a different guise and with a different
justification. In government speech cases from Rust to Summum,
the Court has held that the government’s right to exclude is not a
property right but a means of expression.200 And because the gov-
ernment’s expression is entirely exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny, it seems to follow that there is no constitutional bar to
such expressive exclusions. The government, therefore, has again
become like any other property owner. Parts II.B and II.C consider
some of the circumstances in which government property rights are,
or are not, expressive. 
B. Nonexpressive Government Property
One of the most common rationales advanced for government
speech doctrine is that the government must allocate scarce re-
sources. Making allocative decisions requires the government to
make “expressive” decisions, or so the theory goes.201 But the fact
that the government must exclude some would-be speakers from a
199. As a practical matter, the government may still have broad power to regulate private
speech in a public forum using time, place, manner, and other restrictions. But that is a
different matter from simply invoking the right to exclude.
200. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
73 (1991).
201. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998); Ark. Educ.
Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998).
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scarce resource does not necessarily mean that the government has
“expressed” anything by excluding them. Exclusion-by-scarcity is
simply inescapable, a product of the laws of physics rather than the
laws of property. The Supreme Court, acknowledging this higher
law, has recognized that “two parades cannot march on the same
street simultaneously, and government may allow only one.”202 This
kind of exclusion—which I call incompatibility, but which could just
as accurately be described as scarcity or rivalrousness—is not in and
of itself expressive, but it nonetheless raises important questions
about the relationship between property, expression, and exclusion.
The following Sections attempt to address those questions.
1. Incompatibility
The physical monuments in Summum demonstrate in particu-
larly tactile fashion that expressive acts are not always compatible
with one another. Although it may not be as easy to visualize as the
incompatibility of two monuments on the same plot of land, incom-
patibility is a problem in nonphysical forums as well, for example,
when it comes to two broadcasts on the same bandwidth.203 Even in
an infinitely large Speakers’ Corner, expansive enough to physically
accommodate all speakers, problems of incompatibility would arise:
the volume, pitch, and persuasiveness of some messages would
inevitably drown out others. As the Supreme Court explained in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, “When two people converse face to
face, both should not speak at once if either is to be clearly under-
stood.”204
202. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); see also id. at 116 (suggesting
that “[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time”); NORMAN REDLICH ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1211 (3d ed. 1996) (“[I]f a number of speakers want to use the same
public forum at the same time, they will drown each other out and no speaker could convey
her particular message. Thus, ... the Court has permitted government to place certain
restrictions on this right.”).
203. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969) (finding that the scarcity of
broadcast bandwidth justifies limitations on First Amendment protections); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, A Dangerous Free Speech Ruling, 45 TRIAL 60, 61 (2009) (“Perhaps a distinction
could be drawn between permanent monuments, as in Summum, and transitory speech, such
as demonstrations. It is impossible to explain, though, why this is a distinction that would
matter under the First Amendment’s requirements.”).
204. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387.
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One might argue that incompatibility is not a problem for
messages, even if it is for the means by which they are expressed.
After all, we generally believe that ideas beget, rather than pre-
clude, more ideas.205 As Thomas Jefferson explained when discuss-
ing the desirability of intellectual property rights—that is, rights to
exclude others from using a particular idea or expression:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others
of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called
an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as he keeps
it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into
the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses
the less, because every other possess the whole of it.206
Indeed, in many ways, and under most conditions, speech can be
reproduced so easily that it probably is less rivalrous than other
goods.207 The same has been said of government speech, even gov-
ernment religious speech. Noah Feldman, for example, argues that
“[t]alk can always be reinterpreted, and more talk can always be
added, so religious speech and symbols need not exclude.”208
Even so, it is undoubtedly true that, to the degree speech employs
or relies on places and things—and as Part I.B.1 argued, it almost
always does—it raises problems of incompatibility for precisely the
same reasons as ownership of property. We cannot all shout on
Speakers’ Corner at the same time. Moreover, it is simply not the
case that speech markets are infinitely elastic, nor can they accom-
modate all speakers on equal footing.209 The marketplace of ideas is
205. McGinnis, supra note 81, at 67 (“There does not seem to be a limited supply of ideas,
and one person’s production and transmission of ideas does not deny those opportunities to
others.”).
206. BOYLE, supra note 90, at 20 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac
McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333-34 (Albert Ellery
Bergh ed., 1907)). 
207. See, e.g., id. at 2-3. 
208. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE
SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 238-39 (2005).
209. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 16-17; cf. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1555-72 (1993)
(arguing that intellectual property rights can threaten to violate the Lockean proviso by not
leaving enough and as good for others).
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a competitive place—that is the very justification for its existence,
after all—and thus it is inevitable that some ideas will win out over
others. As Holmes himself put it: “[T]he best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.”210 
Thus the marketplace of ideas—or, at the very least, the market-
place of expression—faces issues of scarcity and incompatibility.
Speakers are often unable to express themselves, or at least cannot
do so in their preferred method, because some other speaker has
already claimed their desired spot. In that sense, the would-be
speaker has been “excluded.” But this is not the kind of expressive
exclusion discussed at length in Part I. Indeed, this kind of exclu-
sion is not even volitional. The later-arriving speaker has simply
been crowded out by others wishing to express their messages, not
to stifle his. 
2. Managing Incompatibility: Public Forum Regulation as
Commons Management
As noted above, government speech doctrine has often been
justified as necessary to manage problems of incompatibility.
Indeed, government speech cases almost always involve allocation
of scarce resources like public funding or space in a public park.211
And although such cases typically are not classified as involving
government speech, the same basic questions arise in cases in-
volving the government’s role as an editor or patron of the arts.212
The resources available to private speakers—funding, venues, and
so on—are scarce, and therefore not all private speakers can be
accommodated at once. In those cases, the Court has often, though
210. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (1977) (“The rationale of the
First Amendment is that only if an idea is subject to competition in the marketplace can it be
discovered (through acceptance or rejection) whether it is false or not.”).
211. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 149 (1939) (recognizing that the State holds
title to public streets and parks as a trustee of the people).
212. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (upholding
enabling statute vesting the National Endowment for the Arts with substantial discretion to
award grants through content-based inquiry).
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not always, invoked the Rust principle, holding, for example, that
“[j]ust as forum analysis and heightened judicial scrutiny are
incompatible with the role ... of the NEA, they are also incompatible
with the discretion that public libraries must have to fulfill their
traditional missions.”213
But if incompatibility itself is not expressive, it is not immediately
clear why managing incompatibility should be. Here, the concept of
property makes its dramatic reentrance, for “law and economics
scholars note that the payoffs from property are very strongly
associated with scarcity. Nobody bothers to create property for some
resource that lies around in abundance.”214 In other words, incom-
patibility and scarcity are the root of property itself. 
What this means for the expressiveness of the right to exclude is
a complicated question, one that involves the very idea of the public
forum. As explained above, the public forum, though formally owned
by the government, is in many ways an odd form of property. That
is, the right to exclude is the sine qua non of property, but the gov-
ernment’s ability to exercise that right in a public forum is severely
circumscribed. As a result, in theory the public forum appears and
behaves somewhat like a commons, what James Boyle calls the
“commons of the mind.”215 At least ideally, the public forum is a
place where all members of society can contribute and consume
ideas and forms of expression.
Property scholars may already be shaking their heads. The com-
bination of open access and incompatibility just described as
characterizing the public forum is what gives rise to the central
“tragedy” in property scholarship, and indeed to the very notion of
property itself. Put in its simplest form, the tragedy of the commons
arises where there are no property rights in a shared but scarce
resource.216 In such circumstances, each individual user has an
213. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (citing Finley, 524 U.S.
at 569). Finley itself cites Rust directly. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 588.
214. Carol Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emissions
Trades, and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 134 (1998).
215. BOYLE, supra note 90, at 47. Boyle differentiates between the public domain, which
is generally used to refer to “material that is not covered by intellectual property rights,” and
the commons, to which all of society has access. Id. at 38-39. 
216. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 712 (1986) (noting that “[w]hen things are left open to the
public, they are thought to be wasted by overuse or underuse”).
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incentive to overuse the resource, because she will reap the full
benefits of her individual use but will bear only a fraction of the cost
of the overuse to which she contributes.217 In his canonical state-
ment of the commons problem, Garrett Hardin illustrated the
problem using the example of a field (“commons”) being overgrazed
by sheep.218 Without property rights, each shepherd will graze his
sheep as much as possible. But if they all do so, the commons will be
destroyed and net utility lost.
Extending the analogy to speech acts in a public forum is
relatively straightforward.219 As with farmers and their sheep—who
gain the full benefits of their grazing but bear only a fraction of the
cost of overuse—a speaker who erects a monument in the park
captures the full gains of his expression but bears only a fraction of
the cost of the clutter it causes. In either case, the initial user does
not leave as much and as good for later users.220 The result is
destruction of the speech commons through overuse. Once again,
Summum provides a useful example. The Court noted that “forum
doctrine has been applied in situations in which government-owned
property or a government program was capable of accommodating
a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential
function of the land or the program.”221 But the Court found that
treating Pleasant Grove’s park as a public forum—thus allowing
relatively free construction of monuments by private speakers
—would inevitably threaten other private speakers’ ability to erect
their own monuments.222 “And where the application of forum
analysis would lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is
obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”223 The Court thus
essentially treated the park as something of a speech “commons,”
subject to overuse by individuals who could capture the full benefit
217. Id.
218. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
219. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a
Core Common Infrastructure 47-48 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf.
220. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-09 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690).
221. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1137 (2009).
222. Id. at 1138.
223. Id.; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (“[T]he licensee has
no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency
to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.”).
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of using the commons—that is, those who could express their own
views through a statue or monument—while bearing only a fraction
of the cost of this overuse.
One way to respond to problems of scarcity is by assigning
property rights. When rights are clearly allocated and protected,
individual property owners have a direct stake in how the commons
is used, and thus a reason to prevent overgrazing.224 As long as their
rights are enforceable, property owners also have a means to
prevent overgrazing: they can exclude some would-be grazers. As
Coase famously argued, under ideal conditions it does not even
matter to whom property rights are initially allocated. As long as
they are clearly defined and protected, they will end up in the hands
of those who value them most.225 
But this is not the solution the Court chose in Summum. Rather
than giving property rights to individuals, Summum vested the
right to exclude in the government. Essentially, it endorsed public,
rather than private, management of the commons. This was not
inevitable. The tragedy of the speech commons does not compel the
conclusion that the government must be given the right—let alone
an almost unlimited226 “expressive” right—to exclude speakers, any
more than the tragedy of the commons compels government
management of grazing. The speech commons could just as easily be
saved if property rights were given to private actors—would-be
speakers, that is—on some content-neutral basis. This, of course, is
precisely the conclusion many property scholars have reached with
regard to other commons problems.227 The person who values his
speech—or sheep—or simply has more speech acts he wishes to
224. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002).
225. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960) (“[I]f market
transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of equity apart) is that the rights of the
various parties should be well-defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.”).
Coase recognized that the theorem which bears his name was simply a thought experiment,
because the assumptions on which it relies do not reflect reality. R.H. Coase, The Institutional
Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717 (1992).
226. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1127 (“[G]overnment speech must comport with the
Establishment Clause.”).
227. See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (describing and criticizing such
approaches).
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perform—or sheep he wants to graze—will presumably pay more
than someone who does not.228 If the Summum truly value their
speech, for example, they will demand a high premium for relin-
quishing their right to speak, or else be willing to pay a correspond-
ingly high premium to buy someone else’s. The same could be said
for many other areas of speech in which scarcity is the justification
for speech regulations.229 And if someone must have the right to
exclude, why not simply give it to those who speak first? Granting
the right to exclude to the first speaker might well encourage more
speech, in much the same way as property laws that vest rights in
the first person to utilize water,230 find a shipwreck,231 or strike oil232
are thought to encourage those useful activities. Indeed, this is one
of the basic theories behind our current system of copyright.233 
In any event, giving the government the power to “protect” the
public forum by excluding private speakers is not an inevitable
solution to the tragedy of the speech commons, nor does it show that
such exclusions are somehow “expressive.” The Court has implicitly
noted as much in cases like Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia, in which the Court held unconstitutional the
denial of funding to a Christian student newspaper, saying that
it is “incumbent on the State ... to ration or allocate the scarce
228. Of course, the Coase Theorem is famously insensitive to distributional concerns, so
it might well be that some speakers could afford more speech than others.
229. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 201
(1987) (“It is not technological scarcity that is at work [in broadcasting cases], but lack of a
property mechanism to allocate the right to broadcast.”); R.H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959) (arguing that nearly all resources
are scarce and that market mechanisms can generally allocate them).
230. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law
for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861 (2001).
231. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 105-06 (1978);
see also Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, Murky Waters: The Law and Economics of
Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 285-86 (2006) (arguing that current
doctrine, which “entitles salvors to a share of the value of salvaged ships whose owners can
be located ... and the full value of abandoned ships,” provides financial incentives for salvors
but could do more to encourage salvage of historic wrecks with solely historical value).
232. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008) (“The
rule of capture is a cornerstone of the oil and gas industry and is fundamental both to
property rights and to state regulation.” (citing 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG
WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.1(A) (2d ed. 1998))).
233. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
1464 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1413
resources on some acceptable neutral principle.”234 Such a principle
need not be related to the government’s own expressive interests. If
a particular forum is indeed scarce—broadcast bandwidth, for
example—then the government may have a “compelling” interest in
limiting some private speakers in order to protect others.235 But that
interest has nothing at all to do with the government’s own
message, which is what is so problematic about the Court’s ulti-
mate, and unanimous, conclusion that Pleasant Grove’s manage-
ment of its park constitutes “speech.” The Court essentially took a
nonexpressive exclusion—the incompatibility of multiple monu-
ments—and transformed it into an expressive one by giving the
government the right to exclude and characterizing that right as
expressive.
C. Expressive Government Property
If not all government exclusions are expressive, how are we to
decide which ones are? This Section argues that one way to do
so—and perhaps the best way—is by applying a listener-focused test
that would ask both whether the government intended to communi-
cate a particularized message, and whether a reasonable observer
would believe the government to be speaking. Other scholars have
convincingly advocated this approach for democracy-related reasons:
if the government is to be held accountable for its speech, it must be
transparent in making it.236 This Section attempts to show that the
listener-focused view of government speech would also reflect a
more accurate treatment of public property. Like public forum doc-
trine itself, such an approach would invoke a more nuanced view of
government property as a social institution and not just as a formal
entitlement.
234. 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (emphasis added).
235. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 367 (1969) (holding that broadcast stations
are protected by the First Amendment, but nonetheless upholding federal requirement that
broadcasters give “fair coverage” to “each side” of “public issues”).
236. See, e.g., Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 983, 1005-15 (2005); Norton, supra note 2, at 590.
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1. The Reasonable Observer Approach to Government Speech
Part II.B.2 considered, and rejected, the scarcity management
justification for government speech doctrine. But scholars have also
justified the doctrine for “listener-based” reasons—not the govern-
ment’s “right” to speak, but rather the interests of citizens in
hearing what the government has to say. As Abner Greene points
out, “government speech can help foster debate, fleshing out views,
and leading toward a more educated citizenry and a better chance
of reaching the right answer.”237 At the very least, Steve Shiffrin
notes, transparent and clear government speech should aid demo-
cratic accountability by giving the public “the advantage of knowing
the collective judgment of the legislature and of knowing the views
of its representatives, which would in turn be useful for evaluating
them.”238
If the true value of government speech lies in its impact on
listeners, how should it be operationalized in doctrine? One possi-
bility is to adopt a viewer-focused test that defines government
speech based on the perspective of a reasonable observer. Variations
on this kind of test already exist in other areas of First Amendment
law. The Spence test, for example, accords First Amendment pro-
tection to symbols wherever they convey messages that are “direct,
likely to be understood, and within the contours of the First
Amendment.”239 The “endorsement” test that the Court has occa-
sionally applied in Establishment Clause cases is similar. That test
was first articulated in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, and since then
has been used widely, if somewhat sporadically.240 Simply stated, it
asks whether a “reasonable observer” would perceive the govern-
237. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000).
238. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 604.
239. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974).
240. Alberto B. Lopez, Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance of Free
Speech and Establishment, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 195 (2003) (arguing that the endorsement
test became the preferred test for Establishment Clause cases after Allegheny). But see 2
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 87
(2008) (connecting prominence of the endorsement test to the fact that Justice O’Connor was
the swing vote in many Establishment Clause cases); Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires:
From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 137 (“With the
departure of Justice O’Connor—the author and most committed supporter of the endorsement
notion—there is a good chance that the test will retire along with her.”). 
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ment as having endorsed a particular religious message, such as a
Ten Commandments monument.241 
It requires only a slight tweak to transform these into a straight-
forward government speech test: government speech exists wher-
ever a reasonable observer would perceive the government to be
speaking. This is effectively what Justice Souter suggested when he
argued in his Summum concurrence that the question of govern-
ment speech should not be based on mere property ownership. His
preferred approach would instead “ask whether a reasonable and
fully informed observer would understand the expression to be
government speech, as distinct from private speech the government
chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public
land.”242 Some courts already seem to apply just such a test.243 In
keeping with the principles discussed in this Article, such a listener-
focused approach would be consistent with the character-based
approach to “property” that prevails in public forum doctrine.244 If
the public forum is not defined by formal legal entitlements, why
should government speech be? 
Of course, adopting a reasonable observer test would not mean
ignoring entirely the government’s formal property rights. As noted
above,245 a reasonable observer is likely to base her interpretation
of an expression at least in part on her understanding of who has a
right to exclude, thus effectively combining the social understand-
ings and legal entitlement views of property. Just how much weight
the latter should receive, however, is debatable. The Seventh Circuit
has adopted, and the Ninth Circuit has rejected, the presumption
that “a sale of real property is an effective way for a public body to
end its inappropriate endorsement of religion” in the absence of
241. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773, 779, 782
(1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concluding that a
Latin cross in a park across from the Ohio Statehouse did not violate the Establishment
Clause because a reasonable observer would not see it as an endorsement of religion). 
242. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring). 
243. See, e.g., Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that
the four-prong government speech inquiry applied in the Tenth Circuit “can be distilled (and
simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: under all the circumstances, would a
reasonable person consider the speaker to be the government or a private party?”).
244. See supra Part II.A (discussing public forum doctrine); see also Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (holding that the existence of a public
forum cannot be identified “merely by identifying the government property at issue”).
245. See supra Part I.D.2.
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unusual circumstances.246 Other courts have used the reasonable
observer test only inasmuch as it conforms with the legal entitle-
ment view.247 The Supreme Court seemed to endorse this principle
in Buono and Summum.248
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Buono also seemingly
introduced a new twist on the reasonable observer test.249 The
plurality noted that the district court had enjoined the land transfer
statute on the grounds that it would create a perception of endorse-
ment, but faulted the district court for failing to inquire “into the
effect that knowledge of the transfer of the land to private owner-
ship would have had on any perceived governmental endorsement
of religion, the harm to which the 2002 injunction was addressed.”250
In other words, the plurality would include formal land ownership
among “the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the
symbol and its placement.”251 But it seems likely that the plurality’s
discussion of the reasonable observer was specific to the unusual
facts of Buono and to the plurality’s conclusion that the district
court had erred by granting an injunction for one reason but then
using it to enjoin government conduct for another. Thus, even
holding aside the fact that Buono contained no majority opinion,
there is reason to doubt whether it altered the reasonable observer
approach to endorsement, even in the Establishment Clause con-
text.
The reasonable observer test would therefore be fully consistent
with a property-based approach to government speech, even though
it would also require serious changes in current government speech
doctrine. Presently, the doctrine does not even require the govern-
246. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing and rejecting
the Seventh Circuit rule), rev’d sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
247. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that “under all the
circumstances a reasonable and fully informed observer would recognize the message on the
‘Choose Life’ specialty plate as the message of a private party, not the state”).
248. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (“Even if [the injunction’s] purpose were characterized more
generally as avoiding the perception of governmental endorsement, that purpose would
favor—or at least not oppose—ownership of the cross by a private party rather than by the
Government.” (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009))).
249. Buono was not the first time Justice Kennedy had criticized the test. See County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
250. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819.
251. Id. at 1819-20.
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ment to identify itself when speaking, much less that reasonable
observers be able to identify it. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass’n, for example, the Court held that government speech was not
dependent on “whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify
the speech as the government’s.”252 This demonstrates one of the
central difficulties in harmonizing property- and endorsement-based
approaches to government speech doctrine: once the concept of
property is disaggregated in line with Part I’s approach, cases will
inevitably arise in which different conceptions of property point in
different expressive directions. For example, an observer—even a
reasonable one—may understand property rights in a way that
differs sharply from the way those rights are formally recognized.
Nowhere is this more common, or problematic, than in situations
in which private property appears to be publicly owned, or vice
versa. This was the difficult question at issue in Buono: how does
one “fix” a situation in which the government appears to be en-
dorsing a religious message that is actually being communicated
through or on a piece of private property? Such cases also leave open
the question whether courts should find Establishment Clause
violations in the reverse situation: when a cross is government prop-
erty but appears to be private. The fact-intensive inquiries neces-
sary in these cases are the same inquiries that would be needed to
establish who is a “real” property owner.
The cases discussed in Parts II.C.2, II.C.3, and II.C.4 illustrate
this phenomenon. The first set of cases involves situations in which
the government has attempted to transfer formal title of racially
segregated property to a private actor in order to avoid Equal
Protection obligations. In those cases, the underlying (and imper-
missible) property-based expression is based on the exclusion of
African Americans.253 The second set of cases involves situations in
which the government has attempted to do the same in cases in-
volving Establishment Clause violations. The underlying expression
in these cases is based on the inclusion of religious iconography.254
252. 544 U.S. 550, 564 n.7 (2005); see also Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132,
1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (refusing to consider, as part of a multifactor test, “who the listener
believes to be the speaker”); Lim, supra note 167 (criticizing the test as a “four-factor
disaster”).
253. See infra Part II.C.2.
254. See infra Part II.C.3.
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Finally, the third set of cases involves an ongoing government
speech controversy that has divided the circuits: whether specialty
license plates constitute government speech.255
Together these cases demonstrate that the endorsement ap-
proach can be applied usefully even to situations in which the
government has no formal property rights. In other words, courts
are rightly willing to look beyond formal property relations and to
consider social understandings of property. Were it otherwise, the
government could avoid its constitutional obligations simply by
privatizing its property in such a way as to continue constitutionally
problematic practices such as racial exclusion or religious expres-
sion.256 Courts have recognized, in other words, that a doctrine
focused on title transfers and other aspects of formal ownership
“invites manipulation.”257 Moreover, courts are attuned to the ex-
pressive nature of exclusion. By recognizing the social nature of
property, courts also recognize the expressive power of exclusion,
and vice versa.258
Crucially, none of this analysis means ignoring “property.” It
simply requires courts to focus on property as it is socially recog-
nized and understood, not as it is recorded in title registries. Parts
II.C.2 and II.C.3 show how the theory works in practice.
2. Racial Exclusion Cases
The use of racial segregation as a form of expressive exclusion is
a central element not just of our constitutional history, but of our
national narrative. In cases involving efforts to exclude racial
minorities from land that was formally private but apparently pub-
lic, courts have affirmed two of the central propositions discussed
here: exclusion is itself an expressive act, and formal property rights
are part—but only part—of identifying the source and effect of such
an exclusion. 
255. See infra Part II.C.4.
256. See generally John C. Crees, Note, The Right and Wrong Ways To Sell a Public Forum,
94 IOWA L. REV. 1419 (2009).
257. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.
2000).
258. See supra Part I.C.
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Expressive exclusion was at the heart of segregation and
segregated society, and its importance to segregationists and white
supremacists was demonstrated by their extraordinary efforts to
preserve it.259 One well-known legal example should suffice to illus-
trate the point. In Palmer v. Thompson, the Jackson, Mississippi,
city council voted to close its public pools rather than comply with
a court order that they be desegregated.260 The town’s white citizens
apparently thought it was more important to exclude blacks from
the pools than to use them themselves. The Supreme Court held
that this decision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because the pools were equally closed to all users.261 But the Court
did not question whether the city council’s decision expressed a
message of racial superiority.262 
This expressive exclusion was undoubtedly effective—it conveyed
a powerful message of racial hierarchy, no matter how strenuously
its defenders disingenuously tried to insist that excluding people on
the basis of race was consistent with treating them as equals.
Charles Black treated such arguments with the seriousness they
deserved, explaining that whenever it is “solemnly propounded” that
segregation was consistent with equality “we ought to exercise one
of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter.”263
No black person denied access to a restaurant, school, or water foun-
tain could fail to grasp that his or her exclusion was an expression
of white superiority. Indeed, that basic insight was the foundational
principle of Brown v. Board of Education, in which the Court recog-
nized that “separate but equal” schools were “inherently unequal”
because they signaled to excluded black students that the State
considered them to be inferior:264 “Segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
259. See generally DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW 1836-1948 (1998).
260. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
261. Id. at 226.
262. Justice Black’s majority opinion implicitly recognized the contrary, turning instead
on his conclusion that “no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal
protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.” Id. at 224; see also
id. at 240-41 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the pool closings were “an expression of
official policy that Negroes are unfit to associate with whites”).
263. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
424 (1960).
264. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law;
for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”265 
Brown may be the best-known example, but it is not the only one
worth exploring. Perhaps even more demonstrative of both the
expressive nature of exclusion and the social nature of property
rights are Evans v. Newton266 and Evans v. Abney.267 Those cases
involved a park left to the city of Macon, Georgia, by a private party.
The terms of the trust governing the park provided that it was to be
used as “a park and pleasure ground” for whites only.268 Private
citizens challenged the restriction on Equal Protection grounds,
arguing—as had the petitioners in Brown—that the exclusion of
racial minorities sent an impermissible message of racial discrimi-
nation. Rather than try to argue that the exclusion was not
expressive, the city resigned as trustee of the park. 
Three private citizens were appointed to replace the city as
trustee,269 thus effectively transferring the legal title out of public
hands. If property ownership were simply a matter of formal
entitlements, this should have sufficed to end any constitutional
concerns, since the Equal Protection Clause does not bind private
individuals. But despite the transfer of formal “ownership”—that is,
trusteeship—the Supreme Court held in Newton that, in light of the
fact that the city was “entwined” with the management and main-
tenance of the park, the “momentum it acquired as a public facility
is certainly not dissipated ... by the appointment of ‘private’ trust-
ees.”270 Thus the courts—as they would in other cases—proved to be
attuned not just to property as a legal entitlement, but as a social
understanding.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Newton, the Georgia
courts held that the trust had failed and that the park must be
closed because the trust’s exclusionary clause could not constitution-
ally be enforced.271 Private citizens this time challenged the decision
265. Id. at 494 (quoting finding of the Kansas court) (internal citation omitted).
266. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
267. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
268. Newton, 382 U.S. at 297.
269. Id. at 298.
270. Id. at 301.
271. Abney, 396 U.S. at 436.
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to close the park, and the case again came before the Court, which,
as it later would in Palmer, upheld the decision to close the park
rather than integrate it.272 As in Palmer, it did not escape the
Justices’ notice that the park’s closing was done “for the sole reason
that the public authority that owns and maintains it cannot keep it
segregated”273 and that the closing “conveys an unambiguous
message of community involvement in racial discrimination” which,
like the segregation of schools in Brown, effectively signaled a belief
in the inferiority of blacks.274
Of course, these cases all arose under the Equal Protection Clause
rather than the First Amendment. That may explain why most free
speech scholars ignore them.275 But what makes them cases about
racial discrimination, and not simply about trespass, is the expres-
sive nature of property. By excluding African Americans, the park’s
managers (whether the city or private trustees) conveyed messages
of white superiority and black inferiority. What makes Newton and
Abney constitutional cases—involving state action, that is, despite
the right to exclude being exercised by private property owners as
a formal matter—is courts’ willingness to recognize implicitly that
“property” is not just a legal entitlement but also a system of shared
social understandings. 
Newton and Abney are not the only cases addressing the expres-
sive value of racial exclusion and the government’s attempt to
distance itself from that expression by transferring formal owner-
ship.276 In many of these cases, as in Newton itself, courts looked to
social understandings of ownership rather than formal title.277 In
other words, the perception of exclusion, and the expression it sent,
trumped formal legal rights. These cases are of course closely re-
lated to—in fact, are a subset of—those in which the Court has
272. Id. at 444.
273. Id. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 453-54.
275. As usual, Zick is the exception. See Zick, Property as/and Constitutional Settlement,
supra note 82, at 9-11 (analyzing Newton and Abney, as well as the Establishment Clause
cases discussed below).
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425, 426 (4th Cir. 1957) (holding, in
a case involving a racially exclusive golf club leasing property from the city, that “the right
of citizens to use public property without discrimination on the ground of race may not be
abridged by the mere leasing of the property”). 
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found state action to exist even when a private actor appears to be
the one engaged in constitutionally questionable activity.278 They
are not inconsistent with property law; they simply recognize it as
encompassing more than title ownership. 
3. Inclusion of Religious Symbolism
Racial discrimination cases are not the only ones in which the
government has attempted to use private property law arrange-
ments to avoid constitutional obligations. Perhaps even more
common—and certainly more recent—are those cases in which
public actors have tried to evade not the Equal Protection Clause,
but the Establishment Clause. 
At least until the Supreme Court decided Summum and Buono,
the leading analysis of public-private property transfers involving
religious iconography came in a pair of Seventh Circuit cases. The
first was Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of
Marshfield, in which the Seventh Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of a fifteen-foot tall statue of Jesus Christ that stood in a
public park.279 A private citizen sued, claiming that the statue
violated the Establishment Clause, and the city responded by selling
to a private organization the small piece of land on which the statue
stood, retaining a restrictive covenant requiring the land to be used
for a public park.280 Despite the title transfer, the property itself was
not visibly differentiated from the rest of the park, which was
clearly public property. The city did, however, put up a disclaimer
noting that the location of the statue did not reflect the city’s
endorsement of its religious message.281 
In evaluating whether this rearrangement of formal property
rights cured the alleged Establishment Clause violation, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that courts must “look to the substance
of the transaction as well as its form to determine whether govern-
278. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) (holding
that a private party and the State had become so closely connected that the private party’s
racial discrimination constituted state action subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause). 
279. 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000).
280. Id. at 490.
281. Id. at 489.
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ment action endorsing religion has actually ceased.”282 So, although
the Seventh Circuit considered the formal transfer to be evidence of
a “real” transfer,283 it did not decide the case based on who held title
to the property, or the fact that the city retained formal rights
through a possibility of reverter.284 Instead, the court considered the
statue from the point of view of a reasonable observer and decided
that such an observer would conclude, based on the location of the
statue and the layout of the park, that the statue was still part of
the park and was endorsed by the park’s perceived owner—the
government.285 In other words, a reasonable observer would perceive
that the religious statue was on city property, infer that the city had
the power to exclude it, and conclude, based on its failure to do, that
the city endorsed it—exactly what the Establishment Clause
forbids. Thus the social understanding of the government’s property
rights trumped its rights as a formal matter. 
In Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, the Seventh Circuit
considered a slightly different scenario but viewed it through the
same lens.286 In Mercier, citizens brought an Establishment Clause
challenge against a Ten Commandments monument that had been
placed in a La Crosse, Wisconsin, public park to honor volunteers
who had fought local flooding.287 After years of litigation and refusal
to move the monument, the city council sold the property on which
the monument was located back to its original donor—the Fraternal
Order of Eagles.288 But, unlike Marshfield, La Crosse and the
Fraternal Order did far more than put up a simple disclaimer
stating that the town did not endorse the Ten Commandments’
religious message. Instead, the Order built a four-foot tall metal
fence around the land and put signs on all sides of the fence
emphasizing that the parcel was privately owned and that the
282. Id. at 491. 
283. Id. (“Absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective way for a
public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.”). 
284. Id. at 492. 
285. Id. at 495.
286. 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
287. Id. at 696.
288. Id. at 696-97. The Fraternal Order of Eagles donated the Ten Commandments
monument whose presentation was found to violate the Establishment Clause in Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), and the monument in the park to which the Summum sought
access, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009).
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monument was dedicated to flood volunteers.289 The city then built
another fence around the Order’s fence and added signs on two sides
stating that the city neither owned the property nor endorsed “the
religious expression thereon.”290 These steps—which were strong
evidence to any reasonable observer that the city had no power to
exclude the monument—ultimately differentiated Mercier from
Marshfield. Although the district court in Mercier found an Estab-
lishment Clause violation, a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit
reversed on the grounds that the location of, fences surrounding,
and disclaimers regarding the Ten Commandments monument
adequately addressed any danger that the public would impute
ownership or endorsement to the government.291 
What makes these cases particularly valuable for highlighting the
relationship between expression and property is the fact that, like
the segregation cases discussed above,292 they involve divergences
between formal and social understandings of property. Although
Marshfield and Mercier reached different results, they asked the
same question: did observable—not simply formal—indications of
ownership show the government to be in control of the relevant loca-
tion? Where they did, the government was found to have endorsed
the religious symbolism located there, because it would appear that
the government had declined to exclude it.293 Where they did not,
however, the government was not found to be speaking.294 In both
289. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 697. 
290. Id. at 697-98.
291. Id. at 702-04.
292. See supra Part II.C.2.
293. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir.
2000) (“[B]ecause the sale does not relieve the continued perception of government
endorsement and grants the Fund preferential access to express its views in Praschak
Wayside Park, we find that the current visual condition of the park constitutes a continuing
violation of the Establishment Clause.”).
294. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705 (describing efforts which, “when coupled with the authority
established under Marshfield and the extensive efforts taken by the City to separate itself
from any religious message the Monument might convey, would surely overcome any doubts
a reasonable observer might have once he or she views the double fencing and multiple signs
surrounding the Monument”); see also Chambers v. Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572-73
(D. Md. 2005) (refusing to enjoin display of Ten Commandments monument on land that had
been sold from the city to the Fraternal Order of Eagles on the grounds that a reasonable
observer would understand that the sale was a genuine attempt to “dissociate” from the
religious monument).
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cases, the social perception of property ownership was equated with
expression.295 
This essentially amounts to a property-based version of the
endorsement test. And that test maps perfectly with the social
relations view of property described in Part I.D. It also strongly
supports the argument in Part I.C that the right to exclude is at the
heart of the relationship between property and expression. By exer-
cising—or, in some cases, not exercising—the right to exclude, the
government as a property owner effectively expresses its approval
or disapproval of religious symbols. Thus, the Establishment Clause
cases, like the racial segregation cases, generally demonstrate both
that property and expression are intertwined and that their
relationship is dependent on more than simply formal ownership.
The central problem is that the cases involve two strong constitu-
tional concerns that pull in opposite directions: the statue in
Marshfield, like the cross in Buono, is either flatly impermissible
government speech or else highly protected private speech. A
decision to categorize a particular symbol one way has immensely
important implications for the other and raises difficult problems
when it comes to remedy. In Marshfield, for example, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the statue constituted impermissible
government speech despite the fact that the land on which it stood
had been formally transferred to a private party.296 To remedy that
constitutional violation, either the statue could be removed, or
“some way must be found to differentiate between property owned
by the [private owner] and property owned by the City.”297 The
former would obviously limit private speech—that of the private
organization that now owned the statue. To avoid this limitation,
the court suggested the addition of “some defining structure, such
as a permanent gated fence or wall, to separate City property from
[private] property accompanied by a clearly visible disclaimer.”298
This proposed remedy was consistent with Justice Kennedy’s
observation in International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
295. See also Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 1422-23 (7th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that, when a private organization donated a crucifix to the township, it became
government property and therefore also became prohibited religious government speech). 
296. 203 F.3d at 495.
297. Id. at 497.
298. Id.
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v. Lee that to change the character of a public forum, the govern-
ment must “alter the objective physical character or uses of the
property, and bear the attendant costs.”299 Thus, the Marshfield
court’s remedy, as well as its holding, confirm that the property’s
social meaning may trump its formal entitlements. 
4. Specialty License Plates
Setting aside the Establishment Clause cases, perhaps the most
important ongoing government speech controversy is that involving
so-called “specialty” license plates bearing political or social
messages like “Choose Life.” The circuits are divided about whether
to classify such plates as private or government speech,300 and the
issue might well reach the Supreme Court. It might be useful,
therefore, to consider whether the principles discussed here—
particularly the three conceptions of property discussed in Part I
and the reasonable observer approach set out in Part II.C.1—can
illuminate the problem.
Part I.B argued that property as a place or thing can be expres-
sive, and that certainly holds true in the case of specialty plates. A
license plate that says “Choose Life,” for example, clearly communi-
cates that very message. But of course the difficult question with
regard to specialty plates is not whether they are expressive, but
what they express and, most importantly as far as government
speech doctrine is concerned, to whom their expression should be
imputed. 
The second conception of property—as a formal property right—
comes closer to addressing that question. As a formal matter, license
plates, like many public forums, are generally government prop-
299. 505 U.S. 672, 700 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
300. Although the facts of the cases differ slightly, four circuits have found specialty plates
to be private speech. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867-68 (8th Cir. 2009); Choose Life
Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863-64 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009); Ariz.
Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56
(2008); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288
F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002). By contrast, a different panel of the Fourth Circuit held that
license plates are a hybrid of government and private speech, Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc.
v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004), and the Sixth Circuit has found them to be
government speech, ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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erty.301 Not only do states own the actual plates, they also retain
control over the process by which specialty plates are selected.
Sometimes this is done through an administrative procedure, and
sometimes by the legislature, but in any case the states have the
power to authorize messages and therefore to exclude unauthorized
ones.302 As in Summum, the exercise of those rights—assuming that
they are not bounded by public forum principles—is undoubtedly
expressive. Thus, following the second conception of property, if the
exercise of formal legal rights is sufficient to create expression, then
license plates are almost certainly government speech. This con-
clusion is only strengthened by the fact that the other potential
speakers have no such formal right to exclude: as a pure matter of
formal property, individual drivers have no right to remove their
plates.303
Finally, the third conception of property—as a social institution—
may be able to cast light on the expressiveness of specialty plates.
As explained in Part II.C, that conception of property lends itself to
a reasonable observer test, which in turn takes into account the
social understandings of exclusionary rights. So, for example, it
stands to reason that “[m]any observers will attribute the presence
of the Confederate flag—on state-issued, state-owned identification
plates embossed with the name of ‘VIRGINIA’—to the Common-
wealth’s endorsement of the symbol and some portion of the cultural
associations it carries.”304 This conclusion flows directly from the
state’s formal exclusionary rights. As the Seventh Circuit put it:
“The State can reasonably be viewed as having approved the
message; it is commonly understood that specialty license plates
require State authorization.”305 
301. See Choose Life, 547 F.3d at 866.
302. See Stephanie S. Bell, Note, The First Amendment and Specialty License Plates: The
“Choose Life” Controversy, 73 MO. L. REV. 1279, 1281-84 (2008) (describing administrative,
legislative, and hybrid models).
303. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).
304. Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1248, 1291 (2010) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (citing Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 252 (4th Cir. 2002)
(Gregory, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]he display of the Confederate
Flag will be attributed to Virginia.”)).
305. Choose Life, 547 F.3d at 864; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 304, at
1298 (“For a number of reasons, observers reasonably assume that states approve and endorse
the messages on their license plates.”). 
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Despite the arguable “expressiveness” of specialty plates, current
Supreme Court doctrine forecloses a finding of pure government
speech, because in Wooley v. Maynard the Court held that “the State
may [not] constitutionally require an individual to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his
private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be
observed and read by the public.”306 Among other things, the Court’s
decision is notable because it found that private individuals would
be compelled to speak despite the fact that they had no formal right
to exclude the state plates.307 In other words, even though displaying
the state motto on a license plate is essentially nonvolitional (and
presumably recognized as such), it still amounted to compelled
speech.308 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the license
plates did not force private expression because “membership in a
class of persons required to display plates bearing the State motto
carries no implication and is subject to no requirement that they
endorse the motto or profess to adopt it as a matter of belief.”309
The Wooley majority’s analysis thus suggests that, despite the
government’s formal rights over them, license plates are also
expressive for the private individuals who design, select, or display
them on their cars. The appellate courts that have considered the
question have reached this conclusion as well. In Planned Parent-
hood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that a reasonable observer seeing a “pro-life” license plate would
conclude that the owner of the vehicle is the actual speaker and
holds the pro-life viewpoint.310 Similarly, in Roach v. Stouffer, the
Eighth Circuit held that “a reasonable and fully informed observer
would consider the speaker to be the organization that sponsors and
the vehicle owner who displays the specialty license plate.”311
The unavoidable implication is that the expression emanating
from specialty license plates is both governmental and private.312
306. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
307. Id. at 715.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 721-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Hoskin, 295 A.2d 454, 457
(N.H. 1972)). 
310. 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004).
311. 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009).
312. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357,
1378-81 (2001); Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 88 DENV. U.
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This makes sense for many reasons, not least of which is the fact
that a reasonable observer would probably conclude that both the
owner of the vehicle displaying the plate and the state government
that authorized it support the plate’s message. Although govern-
ment speech doctrine does not yet recognize such “hybrid” speech,
scholars and judges have increasingly expressed their support for
it,313 especially in the context of specialty license plates.314 The
analysis here suggests that they are right, not only as a matter of
logic, but also as a matter of property. 
CONCLUSION
Much First Amendment theory and doctrine is built around the
premise that property and expression are related, and yet courts
and scholars have few answers—in fact, have asked few broad
questions—regarding the nature of that relationship. Making sense
of it requires a far more nuanced understanding of both concepts.
Expression is more than speech, and “property” can be a place,
thing, legal entitlement, or even a social norm or understanding.
Disaggregating the notion of property helps make sense of those
not-uncommon cases in which concepts of property diverge—for
example, when a private party has formal legal title to a piece of
property, but reasonable observers believe it to be owned by the
government. It also illuminates the various ways in which property
not only enables expression, but is itself expressive. In other words,
the relationship between property and expression is not, as is
commonly supposed, merely an instrumental one. 
But applying these principles to government property threatens
the whole edifice of free speech doctrine, because government speech
is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. If the government’s use
of property rights is “expressive,” then any exclusion from the public
forum is government speech beyond the reach of the First Amend-
L. REV. 899, 917-19 (2010). 
313. See generally Corbin, supra note 52.
314. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 305
F.3d 241, 247 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“I have
stated herein that the speech at issue is hybrid in nature.”); id. at 252 (Gregory, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (lamenting the failure to recognize the “blurry and
sometimes overlapping line between private and government speech”); see also Developments
in the Law, supra note 304, at 1298-1302.
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ment. This simply cannot be. And although the connection between
property and expression causes this mess, it might also provide a
way to clean it up: the line between government speech and the
public forum can be drawn not by abandoning the concept of
property, but by giving up on a formalistic account of what property
means.
Making sense of the relationship between government property
and government expression requires the untangling of a knot that
seems to worsen the more one picks at it. Many of the propositions
discussed here—that property enables expression, for example, or
that exclusions can be expressive—seem simple enough standing
alone. But it is much easier to consider those threads separately
than to make sense of their tangled relationship, much less weave
them into a new tapestry. What is a court to do when formal
property ownership diverges from perceived property ownership?
Doctrinally, how are courts and scholars to make sense of the
relationship between government speech and public forum analysis?
This Article represents an initial effort to frame these questions
properly and to suggest preliminary and partial answers. 

